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REALITY-CHALLENGED PHILOSOPHIES 
OF PUNISHMENT  
ROBERT WEISBERG* 
I.  INTRODUCTION: THE NEW SUBJECT OF MASS INCARCERATION 
The American criminal justice system is arguably the most punitive 
in the world today1 and the most punitive in American history.2  This 
phenomenon has now acquired a dramatic name, mass incarceration, 
meant to induce anxiety about the paradox (or about whether it is a 
paradox) that the wealthiest and most powerful free-market democracy 
imprisons such an anomalously high percentage of its population at a 
time when crime itself is not one of the nation’s pressing social 
problems.3 
Over the past decade, the humanities and social sciences have 
yielded substantial literature examining the rise of mass incarceration 
                                                          
* Edwin E. Huddleson, Jr., Professor of Law, Stanford University; Director, Stanford 
Criminal Justice Center.  This Article is a revised and extended version of the George and 
Martha Barrock Lecture on Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment, which the 
author gave at Marquette University Law School on October 6, 2011.  My thanks to Hans 
Anderson, Stanford J.D. 2014, for his superb assistance on this Article. 
1. The American ratio of incarcerated people to total population is about seven times as 
high as those of other industrialized democracies.  ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON 
POPULATION LIST 1–3 tbls.1–2 (8th ed. 2009), available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/ 
images/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf.  For slightly earlier figures, see BRUCE WESTERN, 
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 14 fig.1.2 (2006).  Unless otherwise indicated in 
this Article, numbers or rates for incarceration or imprisonment in the United States refer to 
both prisons and jails. 
2. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 13 (noting that the U.S. incarceration rate in 2003 was five 
times the historical average over the period of 1925–1975). 
3. Notions of “American exceptionalism” in regard to criminal justice have focused not 
on incarceration (where the anomaly is fairly new) but on the long-term high-crime anomaly.  
The perennial, if questionable, themes have been the power of the frontier and individualism 
in our mythic self-conception, as well as history and consequences of slavery and, to a lesser 
extent, late-nineteenth-century immigration.  See DEBORAH L. MADSEN, AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM 1–4 (1998); Robert Weisberg, Values, Violence, and the Second 
Amendment: American Character, Constitutionalism, and Crime, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 21–22, 
29, 43 (2002).  In recent years, as American crime rates have increasingly converged with 
those in Europe, the focus on crime exceptionalism has been more about homicide than crime 
generally, and even there, the gap is narrowing.  FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON 
HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 51 (1997).  In any 
event, whether high crime can in turn explain high incarceration is itself highly questionable, 
as discussed infra Part III. 
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from various perspectives, ranging from econometric analyses of 
contributory factors to cultural critiques of American exceptionalism in 
penal policy.  At the same time, in an oddly parallel but disconnected 
universe, legal and academic commentators have continued their long 
engagement in jurisprudential debates about the purposes of 
punishment (retribution, general and specific deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation).  But mass incarceration has barely registered in 
these debates.  Perhaps the key irony about this disconnected 
parallelism is that the dominant theme in these jurisprudential debates 
in the academic world has been a robust revival of retributivism,4 the 
very rationale for punishment most associated with the specific legal 
changes of recent decades that are the most obvious causes of the great 
increase in incarceration.  Indeed, even the many new robust critiques of 
modern retributivism have only barely addressed the social costs created 
by U.S. penal policy over the past four decades. 
Amid the passionate controversy about the rise of mass 
incarceration, some recent commentary helps us understand the 
challenges that this phenomenon poses to conventional punishment 
theory.  I will orient my discussion around Punishment and Inequality in 
America, by sociologist Bruce Western and co-researchers Leonard 
Lopoo and Becky Pettit.  Beyond its express mission of social science 
analysis, this recent work seems also to serve as a call for the 
embarrassment of our jurisprudence in light of the penal policies to 
which this jurisprudence often lends aid and comfort.  My discussion will 
rely also on Michael Tonry and Franklin Zimring (and his frequent co-
author Gordon Hawkins), major scholars in the legal academy who have 
bridged the unfortunate divide between legal academia (the home of 
punishment jurisprudence) and criminology.  Tonry’s timely new reader, 
Why Punish?  How Much?, usefully collects the classics of the field and 
exemplars of some of the newer intellectual trends; thus Tonry can serve 
as a running complement to Western and the other books on mass 
incarceration.5  I rely on Zimring (and his frequent co-author Gordon 
Hawkins) for a number of major empirical and policy studies that have 
richly complicated our understanding of the supposed purposes of 
American criminal punishment. 
                                                          
4. For a review of this revival, see Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The 
Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 845–46 & n.2 (2002). 
5. Michael Tonry, Introduction: Thinking About Punishment, in WHY PUNISH?  HOW 
MUCH?: A READER ON PUNISHMENT 3, 3–4, 7 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011) [hereinafter Tonry, 
Introduction]. 
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There is at least a weak excuse for this disconnection between theory 
and social fact regarding American incarceration.  In their magisterial 
1991 book, The Scale of Imprisonment, Zimring and Hawkins reviewed 
the empirical challenge of explaining the incarceration rates of societies 
and observed that “there is no necessary concordance between a 
particular set of jurisprudential principles and the extent of the prison 
population resulting from the application of those principles.”6  But this 
empirical difficulty hardly exonerates those who place the rarefied 
jurisprudence of punishment at the center of the academic world of 
criminal justice at a time when the metastasis of punishment has become 
a defining feature of their society. 
It is worth placing Western’s book in the context of the great 
proliferation of recent books about mass incarceration.  Todd Clear 
examines the removal of young men from inner-city neighborhoods, 
which has perversely devastated social and family structures and 
reinforced criminal proclivities in some who remain.7  Anthony 
Thompson looks at the back end of incarceration, examining how the 
absence or failure of mental health care, drug counseling, and job 
placement for released inmates exacerbates these tragic forces.8  Ruth 
W. Gilmore attributes much of mass incarceration to a prison-building 
boom enabled by surpluses of land, labor, and finance capital.9  Marie 
Gottschalk views the “carceral state” and “penal populism” as 
unintended consequences of social and political forces, including 
progressive activism to combat sexual assault and domestic violence and 
a weakened welfare state that makes victims’ rights advocates into law 
enforcement allies.10  Taking an international and historical perspective, 
James Whitman highlights the irony that European traditions of social 
hierarchy forbade degrading punishments for high-status offenders and 
this solicitude trickled down the social ladder.  Comparatively, in 
America, distrust of government power, aversion to hierarchy, and 
                                                          
6. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT, at xii 
(1991). 
7. TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION 
MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 86–87 (2007). 
8. See ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING COMMUNITIES: 
REENTRY, RACE, AND POLITICS 1–2, 4, 7 (2008). 
9. RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND 
OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 85–86 (2007). 
10. MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS 
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 77–79, 115 (2006); see also Marc Mauer, The Causes and 
Consequences of Prison Growth in the United States, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 4, 4–6 (David Garland ed., 2001) (discussing the changes in 
criminal justice policy that contributed to a rise in incarceration rates beginning in the 1970s). 
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belief in individualism led to a crude egalitarianism of harsh 
punishment.11  Also taking a comparative approach in his own 
monograph, Michael Tonry eschews any question-begging notion of a 
unique American punitive culture.  Instead he isolates the phenomenon 
of “moral panic”—the sudden eruption of anger or fear, sometimes 
sparked by a notorious violent crime, sometimes by an epidemic of 
concern over a form of deviance-like drugs—that can lead to previously 
unthinkable policies that are then perpetuated through legal inertia.12 
Some of the new major books on mass incarceration stand somewhat 
apart from this eclectic set of commentaries.  Works by David Garland13 
and Jonathan Simon14 are in the tradition of grand social theory, linking 
mass incarceration to seismic shifts in the ideology of our political 
economy toward modern neoliberalism, and viewing our penal system as 
a neoliberal instrument to control social disorder and manipulate the 
labor economy.  New books by Glenn Loury15 and Michelle Alexander16 
are passionate moral indictments of incarceration as the reproducer and 
enforcer of racial caste lines. 
Western’s book typifies the eclectic and more ground-level 
approaches of the first set of new books and is perhaps the most 
comprehensive and methodologically versatile among them.  As for the 
second group, although Western acknowledges the larger arc of 
historical forces of the last century, he is cautious about broad claims of 
social theory and ideology.  While deeply sensitive to the racial 
implications of the imprisonment boom, his research underscores that 
income and education levels, while tragically inversely correlated with 
race, are now emerging as the dominant predictors of the social 
stratification wrought by incarceration.17 
On the surface, Western presents a fairly dry, statistically based 
picture of incarceration in the United States, and he does not explicitly 
                                                          
11. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 11 (2003). 
12. MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN 
AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 85–96 (2004). 
13. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY, at x (2001). 
14. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 6 (2007). 
15. See GLENN C. LOURY, RACE, INCARCERATION, AND AMERICAN VALUES 10–11 
(2008). 
16. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 1–2 (2010). 
17. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 11–12.  He infers that the racial disparity in imprisonment 
has gone down slightly in recent years, but that the class disparity has increased.  Id. at 30–31. 
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discuss theories of punishment.  His primary concern is the economic 
implications of modern American penal policy, and I stress the 
deliberate ambiguity or vagueness of the term “implications” because it 
usefully covers various permutations of cause and effect, as well as 
merely suggestive associations.  Western indicts modern penal policy as 
a “systematic state influence on wages and employment” that 
exacerbates social and economic inequality at a time when the urban 
labor market for unskilled people is collapsing.18  Moreover, in a bizarre 
irony that he explains in detail, American incarceration hides many of 
its implications, because our statistical self-assessments of 
unemployment and income exclude the prison population from their 
denominators.19 
But Western is not concerned with ascribing malevolent intentions 
to government or social hierarchy, nor, even in his formal statistical 
analyses, does he commit himself to any overarching econometric 
explanation of the cause of our incarceration rate.  At times he proffers 
some causal explanations, at times he refutes others’ overly confident 
casual analyses, and at times he identifies striking correlations without 
claiming their causal significance.  Conversely, he is somewhat bolder in 
proffering explanations of what mass incarceration itself has caused.   
Western’s overall concern is what punishment means chiefly in the 
sense of what punishment has done, and mainly what it has done is to 
become the dominant social institution through which an increasing 
number of poor Americans live their lives.  As the self-reinforcing 
consequence of certain short-term political governmental decisions and 
prevalent social attitudes thirty years ago, prison and its aftermath 
frame the lives of people as much as or more than does school, career, 
or marriage.  As a result, Western implicitly forces us to realize that our 
standard litany of punishment theories is simply irrelevant to the reality 
we confront.  The penal system that Western documents has no rational 
connection to either retributive (individual desert) theories of 
punishment or deterrence or other consequentialist rationales.  It is a 
system that, deliberately or not, reinforces the economics and 
demographics of diminished social status, and does so in reckless 
disregard of its measurable consequences. 
In Part II, relying on Western’s book and other sources, I review the 
tragic demography of contemporary American incarceration, with its 
drastic disproportions of young and less educated minority men.  Part 
                                                          
18. Id. at xii. 
19. Id. at 94–95. 
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III reviews the most plausible explanations of the sharp upward curve of 
the imprisonment rate in the last thirty years, noting specific legislative 
changes and prosecutorial charging patterns, and some of the political 
forces that may underlie them.  Part IV then returns to Western to 
examine the key social and economic consequences of the rise of 
incarceration, most notably the lifetime earnings and employment 
penalty that makes past incarceration a virtually permanent status for 
millions of Americans.  Part V then offers a brief review of modern 
theories of punishment in our jurisprudence, concluding that the 
dominant theories, most notably the newly robust retributivism, either 
ignore the empirical realities of mass incarceration or address them only 
in evasive and feckless ways.  The Article concludes that both 
deontological and utilitarian philosophies of punishment will founder in 
irrelevance unless they accept some intellectual responsibility for 
engaging the stubborn facts of a system of imprisonment they often 
justify or enable. 
II.  THE DEMOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN IMPRISONMENT 
Almost 1% of the population of the United States is currently 
behind bars.  Another 2% is on parole or probation, and hence at risk of 
incarceration (or reincarceration) at any time.20  The ratio of prisoners to 
population is too crude a measure to allow meaningful comparisons 
among nations, given differences in quality of statistics, crime 
definitions, and administrative schemes.  Nevertheless, the United 
States is clearly an outlier not just among developed democracies (our 
ratio of roughly 700 prisoners per 100,000 people is about six times 
higher than the average for European Union nations) but among all 
nations (Russia and South Africa trail slightly with about 600 and 400 
prisoners per 100,000 people, respectively).21 
The composition of the U.S. prison population will surprise no one.  
About 35% of prisoners are white, less than half the proportion in the 
                                                          
20. Over 4 million Americans are now on probation, LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. 
BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010 
(2011), over 700,000 are in county or local jails, TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2010—STATISTICAL TABLES (2011), and 1.5 million are in 
federal or state prison, PAUL GUERINO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2010 
(2011).  These absolute numbers have increased fourfold to fivefold in the last thirty years, 
during which time the American population grew about 30%.  See John Roman & Aaron 
Chalfin, Does it Pay to Invest in Reentry Programs for Jail Inmates? 2–6 (The Urban Inst., Jail 
Reentry Roundtable Initiative, June 27–28, 2006) available at 
http://www.urban.org/projects/reentry-roundtable/upload/roman_chalfin.pdf. 
21. WALMSEY, supra note 1, at 2 tbl.1, 3 tbl.2, 5 tbl.4. 
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general population.  About 19% of the prison population is 
denominated Hispanic, compared to 15% of the general population.  
About 44% of the prison population is African-American, more than 
three times the 12% share of the general population.22  From another 
angle, Western notes that in 2000, 2.1% of all men aged eighteen to 
sixty-five were incarcerated, but this imprisoned population represented 
1.0% of white men, 3.3% of Hispanic men, and 7.9% of African-
American men.23  The racial disparity in incarceration greatly exceeds 
that for unemployment, nonmarital child bearing, and infant mortality.24 
Western’s study also uncovered the independent significance of 
education level.  Western crunches the numbers this way and that way, 
each statistical angle yielding progressively more depressing or even 
terrifying insights.  Joining education level to race, he looks at the 
chances of members of a cohort going to jail or prison.  Most starkly, in 
2000, regardless of race, people without high school degrees were five 
times more likely to be in prison than those with high school degrees;25 
and black men born in the 1960s who did not complete college were 
twice as likely to have a prison record as they were to have military 
service.26  By age 35, black men are more likely to have gone to prison 
than received a college degree; black high school dropouts are more 
likely to have a prison record than union membership; and non-college 
black men are more likely to have a prison record than military service.27  
As we move down the educational ladder, and with a strong racial 
                                                          
22. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION BY AGE, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC OR 
LATINO ORIGIN FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2000 tbl.1 (2001), available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs/phc-t9/tables/tab01.pdf (providing 
racial breakdown of U.S. population in 2000); Richard Willing, USA’s Prison Population a 
Record, but Growth Slowing, USA TODAY (Nov. 7, 2004), http://www.usatoday.com/news/ 
nation/2004-11-07-women-prison_x.htm (providing racial composition of U.S. prison 
population as of December 31, 2003). 
23. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 17 tbl.1.1. 
24. See id. at 16. 
25. Id. at 73. 
26. More specifically, if we look to Western’s later generation of men, men born 
between 1965 and 1969 (the ones who matured during the biggest incarceration spike), as of 
their thirty-fifth birthday, white men had a 3.2% chance of being incarcerated, a 31.6% 
chance of completing college, a 14.0% chance of serving in the military, and a 72.5% chance 
of getting married.  Id. at 29.  For black men of that generation, 22.4% had been in prison, as 
opposed to 12.5% completing college, 17.4% joining in the military, and 59.3% being 
married.  If we focus solely on those who did not complete college, 6.0% of white men had 
been in prison by age thirty-five, 73.5% had gotten a high school degree or GED, 13.0% had 
served in the military, and 72.8% had married.  For blacks, the respective numbers were a 
31.9% chance of prison, a 64.4% chance of finishing high school, a 13.7% chance of military 
service, and a 55.9% chance of marriage.  Id. at 29. 
27. Id. at 19 tbl.1.2, 29 tbl.1.3. 
15 - WEISBERG (DO NOT DELETE) 7/18/2012  1:23 PM 
1210 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:1203 
disproportion, prison becomes a “modal life event,” a tediously 
predictable part of the condition of being an African-American man in 
the United States. 
III.  CAUSES OF THE INCARCERATION BOOM 
The above figures, especially those involving education level (and by 
implication, economic status), might seem to have some causal 
resonance, but Western offers them chiefly as straightforward statistical 
demographic snapshots.  Starting in the early 1970s, the index crime rate 
increased, peaking at levels 100%–300% higher in the 1980s and early 
1990s than in 1970, but has since dropped to a level equivalent to the 
early 1970s.28  By contrast, the imprisonment rate has risen steadily over 
the same period, and today remains roughly 400% higher than it was in 
1970.29  The positive story should be that the incarceration increase of 
the 1970s through the 1990s was caused by an increase in the crime rate, 
while the post-1990 drop in the crime rate was caused by the increasing 
incarceration rate.  Both phases of this story are highly contestable. 
The Scale of Imprisonment offered a global and historical review of 
the data and the reasons why imprisonment rates may have little to do 
with measurements of crime.30  For example, some large proportion of 
crimes never lead to incarceration, and the gap surely increases when we 
add contemporary drug crimes to the traditional index of serious crimes.  
Additionally, public and political pressure can drive imprisonment, 
often by legislating new crimes.  This pressure is either indifferent to or 
mischaracterizes the crime rate, and crime may be significantly 
determined by the percentage of young males in the population, which 
changes less quickly and severely than the imprisonment rate.  Refining 
these counterintuitive insights, Western observes that juvenile crime and 
adult crime usually move together, and almost all adult criminals have 
been juvenile offenders.31  So if the consistently upward direction of the 
adult incarceration graph after 1980 were the result of more crime, we 
should see a consistent rise in juvenile crime, with more youth involved 
in the drug culture.  But the data show a notable drop in almost all 
categories of crime by American youth between 1980 and 2000.32 
                                                          
28. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 39 fig.2.1. 
29. Id.; see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 49 
fig.3.4 (2007) (showing the same trends from a normalized perspective, with 1975 levels set to 
100). 
30. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 6, at xii. 
31. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 39. 
32. Id. at 41 tbl.2.1. 
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Obviously at some point more incarceration should reduce crime 
through deterrence or incapacitation.33  While empirical findings have 
varied on this question, the consensus is that the contribution of prison 
to the recent crime reduction has been small.  If we estimate the drop 
for serious crime at about 35% between 1993 and 2001, the research 
consensus is that about one-fifth of that crime reduction can be 
explained by the increase in the incarceration rate for that period.34  
Western joins but amends this consensus, again by an imaginative 
reference to juveniles.  If we look to the whole period from 1980 to 2000, 
while adult imprisonment jumped 430%, juvenile incarceration jumped 
only about 50%.35  Yet we have seen a drop in juvenile crime parallel to 
the adult drop.36  Western concludes that absent formal changes in legal 
rules that would restrict juvenile prosecutions—and, if anything, the 
trend has been to lower the age for juveniles to be tried as adults—we 
should have seen a rise of juveniles in incarceration.37 
So perhaps the continuing incarceration boom has to be traced to 
deliberate policies or new practices, such as a dramatic shift toward 
incarceration rather than probation sentences for certain crimes; an 
increase in the length of prison sentences, driven both by formal 
legislation (including habitual-offender and mandatory-minimum laws); 
and a “dramatic increase in the prosecution and incarceration of drug 
offenders.”38  Western does not say that lawmakers premeditated the 
increase in imprisonment.39  These changes “did not require any 
                                                          
33. See RYAN S. KING ET AL., INCARCERATION AND CRIME: A COMPLEX 
RELATIONSHIP 6 (2005).  Nevertheless, as discussed below, returns on incarceration 
ultimately diminish because after concentrating on the highest-rate offenders, the system will 
start incarcerating less potentially prolific ones.  Furthermore, in the area of drug crimes, the 
key determinant of the crime rate may be the number of opportunities rather than the supply 
of malefactors.  Id. 
34. See id. at 4; ZIMRING, supra note 6, at 55; Rucker Johnson & Stephen Raphael, How 
Much Crime Reduction Does the Marginal Prisoner Buy?, 55 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 
2012) (manuscript at 2), available at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~ruckerj/johnson_raphael_ 
crimeincarcJLE.pdf. 
35. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 39–40. 
36. Id. at 41 tbl.2.1 (noting declines in criminal activity among youths from 1980 to 
2000). 
37. Id. at 39–40 (arguing that because juvenile incarceration has only risen modestly, 
“[i]f we observe large declines in juvenile crime, as we have for adults, it is much less likely 
that these are explained by rising incarceration”). 
38. Id. at 50. 
39. See id. at 105.  Western stresses that there are other discretionary stages along the 
way to prison at which greater punitiveness can occur.  He notes that even where reports of 
crimes to the police declined, a higher percentage of arrests led to imprisonment.  Id. at 43–
44. 
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conspiracy on the part of policy makers.”40  Rather, they were rooted in 
a variety of functional and expressive motivations that ultimately reflect 
either a willingness to tolerate or indifference to an increase in prison 
populations and the effects thereof. 
As a corollary, note another important causal factor that needs 
consideration as one reviews Western’s picture of American 
incarceration: the inertia of the incarceration rate itself.  The United 
States has actually proved capable of reducing its incarceration rate—it 
did so at least slightly in the 1970s, just before the major increase 
began.41  Even more remarkably, as he was becoming the leader of 
modern conservatism, then-Governor Ronald Reagan effected an 
amazing 34% decrease in California’s prison population, largely through 
more use of probation, more generous parole release, and far fewer 
parole revocations.42  Moreover, in the last few years budget crises and 
moral doubts over mandatory drug laws have led some states to declare 
truces on the political demagoguery over crime-related issues so that 
they could reduce their prison populations.43  But the conventional view 
is that mass incarceration is here to stay indefinitely, for two primary 
reasons: First, as recent analyses of mass incarceration have shown, once 
incarceration reaches a critical mass, it is self-reinforcing by virtue of the 
criminogenic nature of the prison experience and the resilience of 
American criminal justice institutions in reabsorbing and recycling 
recidivists (so-called “net-widening”).44  Second, even though drastic 
percentage reductions like the one under then-Governor Reagan in 
                                                                                                                                          
 In an important new paper, John Pfaff examines previously unused data to explain the 
sharp increase in imprisonment and concludes that the key cause lay with prosecutors in 
increasing felony filings per arrest, rather than increased arrests by police or longer sentences 
imposed by legislatures or judges.  John Pfaff, The Centrality of Prosecutors to Prison Growth: 
An Empirical Assessment (Working Paper, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1884674. 
40. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 105. 
41. See Rosemary Gartner et al., The Past as Prologue?  Decarceration in California 
Then and Now, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 291, 293 (2011). 
42. Id. at 291, 292, 299. 
43. See Marc Mauer, State Sentencing Reforms: Is the “Get Tough” Era Coming to a 
Close?, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 50, 51–52 (2002); Robert Weisberg, How Sentencing 
Commissions Turned Out to Be a Good Idea, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 179, 201 (2007). 
44. On how parole revocation has become the new major source of prison admissions in 
California, see JOAN PETERSILIA, UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS 73–74 
(2006).  On the complexity and arbitrariness of factors that determine parole revocation and 
thereby confound any meaningful notion of recidivism, see James A. Wilson, Bad Behavior or 
Bad Policy?  An Examination of Tennessee Release Cohorts, 1993–2001, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 485 (2005); and Sheila Royo Maxwell, Essay, Rethinking the Broad Sweep of 
Recidivism: A Task for Evaluators, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 519, 519–20 (2005). 
15 - WEISBERG (DO NOT DELETE) 7/18/2012  1:23 PM 
2012] REALITY-CHALLENGED PHILOSOPHIES OF PUNISHMENT 1213 
California have really happened, the absolute numbers imprisoned now 
are so large that an equivalent percentage decrease has become 
politically infeasible.45 
But if specific governmental policies were the immediate causes of 
the prison boom, what caused them to become our policies?  The 
standard political story combines white populist backlash with the civil 
rights movement, the capture of the white South by the Republicans, 
Nixon’s translation of working class resentment into law-and-order 
propaganda, and general disenchantment with the welfare programs 
established under Presidents Roosevelt, Kennedy, and Johnson.46  But 
what of deeper structural and economic causes?  In their famous 1939 
account, Rusche and Kirchheimer surveyed European history from the 
Middle Ages on and inferred that imprisonment is the way a capitalist 
society deals with surplus labor in times of economic difficulty.47  
Imprisonment goes up to curb social threats of the idle poor, and down 
when those idle poor can be deployed in private production; 
imprisonment can also go up if prison labor can be productive, except if 
the unimprisoned poor then rebel against the competition—“‘if the 
prison does not underbid the slum in human misery, the slum will empty 
and the prison will fill.’”48 
While tempting to materially focused liberal theorists, the Rusche–
Kirchheimer thesis is susceptible to charges of underestimating moral 
and political upheavals (such as “moral panic” and eruptions of 
fascism49), or the effects of a shift to a modern service economy, or the 
differential economic effects of the varieties of sanctions (such as 
probation, which does not necessarily interfere with employment at 
all).50  Worse yet, modern statistical studies, while somewhat confirming 
the short-term positive correlation of unemployment and imprisonment, 
                                                          
45. Gartner et al., supra note 42, at 314. 
46. See id.; Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1246 (2005). 
47. GEORG RUSCHE & OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
50–51 (1939).  This book was based on the famous earlier article by Georg Rusche, 
Abreitsmarkt und Strafvollzug, 2 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SOZIALFORSCHUNG 63 (1933) (Ger.), 
reprinted in 10 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 2 (Gerda Dinwiddie trans., 1978). 
48. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 54 (quoting WEBB & SHAW, ENGLISH PRISONS UNDER 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, at xi (1922)). 
49. Theodore G. Chiricos & Miriam A. Delone, Labor Surplus and Punishment: A 
Review and Assessment of Theory and Evidence, 39 SOC. PROBS. 421, 425–26 (1992). 
50. See Ivan Jankovic, Labor Market and Imprisonment, CRIME & SOC. JUST., Fall–
Winter 1977, at 17, 18 (1977). 
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cast considerable doubt on an inverse relationship with lagging 
unemployment rates. 
The legatees of Rusche–Kirchheimer include David Garland, who 
describes a brutal dialectic whereby the white middle class—
overwhelmed by media depictions of increases in crime and related 
social disorders of drugs, sexual immorality, and political protests, 
fearing the opening of the labor force to women and minorities—is 
coopted by the low-tax, low-regulation Reagan–Thatcher neoliberalism 
into rejecting spending on social improvement and security and thus 
promoting harsh penalty as the sole worthy government program.51  
Jonathan Simon adds to this theme that government learned—and 
taught private citizens and institutions—to deploy both the apparatus 
and public imagery of criminal law (i.e., “governing-through-crime”) to 
address anxiety about social disorder in school, the workplace, the 
housing project, even the suburban “community.”52  But these theories, 
speaking ominously of the deep, broad tropisms of late modernity, are 
often unclear about the strength and specific mechanisms of their 
favored determinants and risk devolving into that default, often 
tautological, category of “culture.” 
As a corollary, comparativists pondering the anomaly of American 
incarceration have explored how differing such forms of modern social 
organization link to incarceration rates.53  Neoliberal societies (e.g., the 
United States) have relatively weak labor unions, reject the pursuit of 
Japanese-style “industrial policies” linking public and private business 
planning, and offer relatively thin welfare programs.54  “Corporatist” 
societies (e.g., Sweden) are more “organized” in the sense of 
establishing by custom, if not rule, close relationships among unions, 
government, social service nonprofits, official agencies, and trade 
groups.  They are more generous in welfare, more regulated, and more 
committed to nurturing institutions of “so-called civil society.”55  For 
John Sutton, incarceration rates correlate with the placement of a 
country along the spectrum from neoliberal to corporatist.56  Extending 
Sutton in her recent book, The Prisoners’ Dilemma, Nicola Lacey 
                                                          
51. See GARLAND, supra note 13, at 85–87, 98–102 (2001). 
52. See SIMON, supra note 14, at 3–13. 
53. John R. Sutton, The Political Economy of Imprisonment in Affluent Western 
Democracies, 1960–1990, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 170 (2004) (analyzing effects of business cycles, 
political power, and the structure of labor market institutions stemming from differences 
between neoliberal and corporatist societies). 
54. See id. at 176. 
55. Id. at 175–76. 
56. Id. at 172, 184–85. 
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observes that more coordinated market economies—such as Germany—
benefit from the discipline of coalition politics and proportional 
representation systems; their bureaucracies are both less politicized and 
less adversarial and so less vulnerable to the vagaries of demagoguery of 
American politicking over crime.57 
Western reviews and partly credits these factors.  He affirms that the 
incarceration boom began as punitive legislation caused by conservative 
backlash against civil rights.58  He also goes beyond the standard political 
story to test the correlation to penal policy of such ground-level factors 
as controlling political parties (the incarceration rate is 14% higher 
under Republican governors), urbanization, and the quantity of (and 
budgetary investment in) police officers.59  But Western’s special 
contribution concerns the relationship between imprisonment rates and 
the decline of the lower-level labor market for minorities. 
First, controlling for certain state-level fixed effects, he finds that for 
the years 1980–2000, every 0.1% increase in a state’s population of 
unemployed men under the age of forty-five who had completed high 
school but not college, was associated with a 2.3% increase in the 
incarceration rate.60  “By 2001, the prison admission rate for all men, 
aged twenty to thirty-nine, would be 20[%] lower if the relative risk of 
imprisonment had not increased so much among high school 
dropouts.”61  Second, looking to income, Western finds that for all black 
and white men combined, a $100 increase in weekly pay—roughly the 
increment attributable to a high school degree—“is associated with a 
32[%] decline in the chances of imprisonment.”62  Between the mid-
1980s and late 1990s, for blacks without a high school degree, a 7% 
employment decline created an 11% imprisonment rise, and the $30-
per-hour pay decrease they suffered between the mid-1900s and late 
1990s is linked to an 8% rise in prison admissions.63  Third, Western 
                                                          
57. NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES 72–73 (2008).  For an argument that 
neoliberalism proves a powerful explanation for the form and scope of a nation’s criminal 
justice system, see BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: 
PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER (2011).  For a critique that attacks the 
concept of neoliberalism as too broad and vague to supply sufficiently determined casual 
explanations, see James Q. Whitman, The Free Market and the Prison, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
1212 (2012) (reviewing HARCOURT, supra). 
58. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 59. 
59. Id. at 69, 71–72. 
60. Id. at 70. 
61. Id. at 77. 
62. Id. at 77–78. 
63. Id. at 78. 
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finds a very strong negative correlation between liberal social welfare 
policy and the state incarceration rate, both across states and within 
states over the last few decades.64 
In sum, the best causal theory is that the number of men—in 
particular unschooled men—who will end up in prison increases as the 
number of men out of the labor force increases and economic support 
provided through welfare policies decreases. 
Fourth, Western somewhat skeptically reviews the Rusche–
Kirchheimer thesis, observing that the unemployment rate as 
conventionally measured fluctuates too much with macroeconomic 
conditions to yield any clear correlations with incarceration.65  But he 
adds the nice twist that official unemployment statistics are a poor 
measure of joblessness because they exclude from the denominator the 
people who are unemployed because they are incarcerated.66  With 
prisoners included, the jobless rates for young white (aged 22–30) males 
in 2000 increases from 10.6% to 12.0%, and the portion of all jobless 
who were incarcerated during the twenty years from 1980 to 2000, when 
the inmate population of young white males went from 90,000 to 
185,000, increases from one-twentieth to one-eighth.67  For “crime-age” 
black men (aged 22–35) without a high school degree, the jobless rate 
for 1980 jumps from 34% to 49%, and in 2000 from 41% to 65%.68  The 
blunt inference from this reframing is that in 2000 a full two-thirds of the 
young adult jobless blacks without a high school degree were in prison—
at the height of a major national economic expansion.69 
But perhaps Western wants to press the idea that the perception of 
economic hopelessness inspires jobless individuals to commit crimes; 
and, that potential offenders view the incarcerated jobless as 
confirmation of their fears and hence further motivation to commit 
crime in some long-run way that is not captured by directly matching 
                                                          
64. Id. at 66–73. 
65. Id. at 67–68. 
66. Id. at 94–95. 
67. Id. at 89.  More strikingly, for young male Hispanics, for whom the actual number of 
incarcerated people jumped from 25,000 to 130,000 between 1980 and 2000, the jobless rate 
jumps from 10.3% to 14.3% with the adjustment for those incarcerated, to the point that of 
this new expanded jobless group, 30% were incarcerated.  Id. at 89–90.  And most strikingly 
of all, for blacks, the jobless rate for young males in 1980 moves from 22.9% to 26.7% with 
the adjustment, while after two decades, when the actual incarcerated population of young 
black men rose from 110,000 to 285,000, the unadjusted jobless rate is 23.7% but the adjusted 
rate is 32.4%, so that one-third of young black jobless men were in prison.  Id. at 90. 
68. Id. at 91. 
69. Id. 
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employment and crime rates.  Perhaps the causal implication of this 
adjustment is intended to be longer-term and even more tentative: That 
is, in jurisdictions where people get recycled in and out of prison, the 
difference between being jobless in and out of prison is ultimately 
unimportant, and these two forms of joblessness are equally self-
reinforcing in terms of perpetual joblessness and poverty, and work 
together to produce future imprisonment.  Western wants to underscore 
the potentially reinforcing nature of joblessness by increasing the 
number who will find it hard to get back into the labor pool and perhaps 
to leave seeds of thought about how incarceration will always feedback 
on itself. 
Thus, Western may be willing to take advantage of whatever 
resonances might arise in the minds of readers as to how a remeasured 
jobless proportion of society helps explain the perpetuation of prison, 
without directly focusing on the intermediation of a rise in the crime 
rate.  And indeed Punishment and Inequality is certainly open to the 
criticism that it slips and slides among confident and more tentative 
causal linkages as well as mere “associations” and correlations that 
intrigue and disturb but have no necessary causal significance.  At times 
Western uses loose language about these correlations, such as saying 
that “[c]lass inequality in imprisonment increased dramatically from 
1983 to 2001, contributing about 20[%] to the rise in risk of prison 
admission.”70  And sometimes his causal hints are stronger: “[Thus,] a 
central implication of labor market theories of incarceration [is that] 
economic inequality expands criminal punishment among the 
disadvantaged by increasing inequality in incarceration.”71  He observes 
that “[t]he rise in the risk of imprisonment among less-educated men 
may be related to trends in their earnings and employment.”72  And he 
attacks traditional research that “offered little suggestion that the prison 
boom was fueled by the poor job prospects of less-skilled blacks.”73 
But consider this statement by Western, about recent American 
history: “Missing, perhaps, some social supports of the European kind, 
violence, disorder and idleness flourished in America’s ghettos, creating 
for government not just an economic problem, but a problem of social 
control.”74  If it vaguely smacks of the leftist social theory approaches of 
Garland and Simon, Western may indeed be tempting us to consider 
                                                          
70. Id. at 78–79. 
71. Id. at 73. 
72. Id. at 77. 
73. Id. at 78. 
74. Id. at 105. 
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these left-social-theory treatments of modern imprisonment.  Indeed, he 
may even be partly resurrecting the Rusche–Kirchheimer thesis, even if 
he is wary of committing to its empirical claims. 
Regardless of whether Western intends some kind of homage to 
Rusche–Kirchheimer, his real goals are surely moral, political, and 
rhetorical.  He wants us to be embarrassed by the economic context and 
consequences of the imprisonment rate.  He sums this up by saying that 
the hidden great numbers of prison inmates “occupy a shadowy status 
that affects a variety of official statistics that record the economic well-
being of the population,” and that “[t]he prison boom makes a new 
contribution to the invisibility of the poor.”75  A Marxist or a highly 
instrumental promoter of the Rusche–Kirchheimer view might argue 
that whatever forces might motivate the powerful to want to increase 
economic inequality or render the poor invisible, prison is a way of 
doing this, but Western’s story reads more like one of reckless 
indifference.  The incarcerated are invisible and therefore we do not 
observe the powerful engine of future economic misery it operates. 
Western eyes, in particular, the common misleading narrative of the 
last decade of the twentieth century as a period of economic boom, 
which greatly reduced the income gap between whites and blacks.  But 
as Western shows, just as the official figures distort the picture of 
joblessness, they distort the wage distribution.76  From the mid-1980s to 
the late 1990s, the wage gap (for hourly wages) between whites and 
blacks went up slightly to a peak in 1985 and then dipped somewhat.77  
Further, even though a Democrat was President for most of the decade, 
the somewhat Panglossian retelling of the 1990s includes the welfare 
reforms credited with enhancing and demonstrating the power of a 
limited government, laissez-faire economy that contrasted with the 
weaker performance of European economies.  To this, Western demurs: 
“The government, rather than withdrawing from the lives of young 
disadvantaged blacks, significantly increased its role.  Lawmakers who, 
in other contexts, would celebrate the value of limited government and 
free markets, adopted policies that massively and coercively regulated 
                                                          
75. Id. at 87. 
76. Id. at 97. 
77. Id. at 98–99 & fig.4.5.  Western acknowledges and allows for the fact that the people 
headed into prison at any point those years were making 80% of the wages of those not 
headed to prison.  But even taking that into account, the effect of including the jailed 
population indicates that the shrinkage in the wage gap was much less than the official 
numbers.  Id. at 100–02.  
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the poor.”78  Western wants to fight the naïve or disingenuous 
puzzlement some have expressed about how imprisonment could rise in 
such a time of prosperity, a view that reinforces the tendency to 
disentangle imprisonment from economic factors and also might induce 
overestimation of the link between crime rates and imprisonment or of 
the credit that prison deserves for the 1990s crime reduction.  The 
imagery of widespread economic success either leads Americans to 
ignore the prison boom altogether, or to shrug at it as beyond any 
explanation—as some odd disconnected fact that might trace to the 
unfortunate, incurable presence of malevolent individuals.79  In fact, he 
wants to challenge any national self-congratulation about the civil rights 
movement because invisible mass incarceration is a form of residential 
segregation, so that by virtue of imprisonment, “the invisibility of 
today’s poor remains rooted in the physical and social distance between 
whites and blacks.”80 
One more causal explanation emanating from social theory is worth 
mentioning: Americans’ belief in our own uniqueness or, to use the 
recurring cliché, exceptionalism.  “The notion of American uniqueness 
or exceptionalism is traditionally traced to Puritan conceptions of a new 
world, created out of virgin territory and charged with special spiritual 
and political destiny.”81  This exceptionalist thinking has shaped many 
fields of inquiry and social practices, including crime.  For many decades 
now, a settled notion among both Americans and Europeans has been 
that the United States has an anomalously high rate of violent—and 
especially lethal—crime.82  While it is difficult to establish actual 
American crime rates before roughly the 1930s, it is even more difficult 
                                                          
78. Id. at 105. 
79. At the risk of sentimentality, Western would like us to recur a bit to the Great 
Depression, when there was relative solidarity in economic misery, and when we were more 
open to believing in structural explanations for social misery.  See id. at 86–87.  He therefore 
also wants us to recur to the spirit of Harrington’s 1962 The Other America and its moral 
achievement in embarrassing the United States into taking poverty seriously.  Id. at 85–86. 
80. Id. at 86. 
81. See Weisberg, supra note 3, at 9.   
This destiny evolves from a religious self-conception into a secular one.  Along the 
way, our exceptional sense of self can become a very brutal thing leading us to 
assimilate or eliminate native peoples in the name of destiny though, as some have 
observed, our special American sense of self allows us to accept or justify violence 
by a claim that in our secular theology violence can and must have a high moral 
purpose to be redeemed. 
Id. 
82. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 3, at 3. 
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to trust figures from other nations; this perception is likely accurate—at 
least for violent crime.83  There are a number of sociological and cultural 
explanations for America’s crime exceptionalism, including the power of 
the frontier and individualism in our mythic self-conception, as well as 
history and consequences of slavery and, to a lesser extent, late-
nineteenth-century immigration.84 
IV.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE INCARCERATION BOOM 
Much of the commentary on mass incarceration alludes to the costs 
associated with harm to families and neighborhoods—costs that are real 
but impossible to measure well.  Western aims at a more measurable 
harm—the direct effect of imprisonment on prisoners’ future 
employment and income. 
Controlling for the pre-imprisonment personal factors that would 
themselves reduce job and money prospects, Western isolates the 
“Aggregate Earnings Penalty” (AEP)—the decrease in future earnings 
attributable solely to past incarceration.85  Western infers that a post-
prison offender will suffer a 30%–40% reduction in annual income, and 
if released in his early twenties, he will enjoy no real wage growth 
whatsoever between the ages of 25 and 35.86  In absolute numbers, 
imprisonment will, on average, cost him around $100,000 over his 
lifetime (ironically, the amount is highest for whites, because their base 
pay is higher on average).87  These findings resonate with those of 
sociologist Devah Pager, who staged employment interviews by sending 
in pairs of testers objectively identical except for the former 
incarceration status of one, with a sufficient racial mix to isolate racial 
discrimination.88  Pager concluded that (wholly apart from all the 
individual factors that would have predicted inmate status) incarceration 
                                                          
83. Id. at 7. 
84. See Weisberg, supra note 3, at 21, 29, 43.  Of course the problem now is that 
American crime rates have increasingly converged with those in Europe, so that the focus on 
crime exceptionalism has to be more on homicide than crime generally, and even there the 
gap is narrowing.  ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 3, at 51.  But however thematically crime 
and imprisonment are related, whatever the cultural relation there is between being brutal to 
each other and our government being brutal to us, the problem is not the crime anomaly but 
the prison anomaly, and for that issue the standard exceptionalism theories, themes, and 
explanations offer less help. 
85. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 125–26. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF 
MASS INCARCERATION, at viii (2007). 
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of white applicants reduced the “callback” percentage from 34% to 
17%; for blacks, from 14% to 5%.89  Western also found that the AEP 
was at least related to other bad social outcomes post-prison: increased 
domestic violence, increased rupture of existing marital or other 
domestic partnership arrangements (in part because of increased 
domestic violence), and possibly reduced future marriageability as well.90  
The disconnected, erratic personal lives of ex-prisoners makes them 
much more likely to recidivate and—depending on parole revocation 
rules—more likely to reenter prison cyclically.  In short, mass 
incarceration has itself produced a new and massive underclass, 
disproportionately made up of racial minorities.91 
Given the picture that emerges from the work of Western and 
others, it does not seem hyperbolic to suggest the United States has lost 
the moral authority to impose retributive punishment and lacks the 
intellectual and political authority to claim any cost–benefit rationality 
in carrying out any welfare-enhancing goals of incarceration.  At the 
very least, it suggests that punishment theorists have a moral obligation 
to reconsider theoretical commitments in light of the grim social reality 
that punishment itself has helped bring about. 
V.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PUNISHMENT RECONSIDERED 
According to a stock story, a revival of retributivism,92 in a mutually 
reinforcing relationship with a legislative movement toward more rigid 
and harsher sentences,93 has driven the last two decades of punishment 
                                                          
89. Id. at 90–91 & fig.5.1. 
90. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 131–63. 
91. For the argument that mass incarceration has created a demimonde of people not so 
much comprising a distinct status but rather as lacking in any political or social status, see 
Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S 
NEW DEATH PENALTY 96, 97–99 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., forthcoming 
2012) (citing theorist Giorgio Agamben for the notion of a “bare life,” GIORGIO AGAMBEN, 
HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 12 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 
1998)). 
92. Russell Christopher collects some of the proclamatory verbiage, including “rise,” 
“resurgence,” and “renaissance,” and also helpfully reviews some of the key scholarship in 
this revival as well as some of the commonly cited explanations for it.  Christopher, supra 
note 4, at 845–46 & nn.2–5.  While public discourse about punishment often relies on the 
rhetoric of retributivism, much of the new sentencing legislation is probably better explained 
by an angry devotion to incapacitation, especially in terms of “three strikes” and other 
habitual offender laws.  Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 17, 
36, 39 (2004).  The blurring of the two is also discussed below in regard to Zimring and 
Hawkins’ book on incapacitation, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE 
RESTRAINT OF CRIME (1995).  See infra Part V.A.4.a. 
93. Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. 
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jurisprudence.  The story focuses on the mid-century failures of 
discretionary sentencing against the once-strong, science-grounded 
promise of rehabilitation.  Promoters spanned the political spectrum, 
with different but converging motives: conservatives denounced 
rehabilitation for excessive leniency and for naïve sentimentality 
regarding the malleability of the individual; civil libertarians denounced 
it for authorizing excessive sentences capriciously disparate while 
unrelated to moral desert.94  In the 1960s, the new retributivism started.  
The reversal was so complete that prominent academics like Albert 
Alschuler expressed self-critical disbelief that they could ever have 
fallen for so bizarre a notion as indeterminate sentencing rooted in 
utilitarian theories.95 
Tonry’s introduction to Why Punish?  How Much? is a wise 
commentary on the “fashions” of punishment theory, and it amends the 
stock story.96  Tonry cautions that fashions change, and that even short-
term phases of change are often equivocal.97  Thus, to say that 
retributivism dominates criminal justice today would be an 
overstatement.  A more accurate characterization might be that we are 
in an uncertain period in which one major factor has been a strand of 
retributivism that incorporates mitigation in the gentle utilitarianism of 
restorative and therapeutic justice.98 
For Tonry, the American system of criminal justice—with its prisons, 
parole boards, juvenile courts, and probation officers—is a mid- to late-
nineteenth century construct driven by unabashedly utilitarian 
motivations.99  Tonry’s creation story describes an era when academic 
commentary greatly influenced policy toward indeterminate sentencing 
as an instrument for tailoring salutary moral education to the needs of 
individual miscreants.100  Indeed, officials and scholars of that era prided 
                                                                                                                                          
CIN. L. REV. 749, 784 (2006). 
94. Weisberg, supra note 43, at 183–84. 
95. Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of 
Recent Proposals for “Fixed” and “Presumptive” Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 552 
(1978). 
96. Tonry, Introduction, supra note 5, at 3, 7. 
97. Id. at 7. 
98. Id. at 23–24. 
99. Id. at 3. 
100. See id. at 14–15.  “Indeterminate” and “determinate” sentencing are ambiguous 
terms.  That is, Americans sentencing at mid-century had generally taken the form of broad 
ranges from which a trial judge could select a sentence followed by discretionary parole, so 
the judge’s decision was unstructured and the ultimate length of time served was 
undetermined at time of sentencing.  The modern turn to determinacy surely reflects new 
punitive attitudes in the United States, but as one leading commentator, Kevin Reitz, has 
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themselves that a high rate of incarceration signaled commitment to 
reforming the misguided.101 
Late-Victorian utilitarianism remained dominant well into the 
twentieth century.  Consider the 1950s’ original Model Penal Code 
(MPC): Although the part of the MPC that law students know best is its 
culpability taxonomy of mental states reflecting moral desert, MPC 
godfathers Jerome Michael and Herbert Wechsler dismissed retributive 
justice as nonsense.  Michael and Wechsler proclaimed that the legal art 
and science of rehabilitative and indeterminate sentencing stands 
unopposed as the spirit of modern criminal law.102  They found allies in 
such academic endeavors as criminologist Sheldon Glueck’s idea for 
actual sentencing power to be vested in a “Socio-Penal Commission” 
consisting of neutral medical and academic experts.103 
Tonry collects classics from Bentham, Kant, and Hegel with modern 
contributions from retributivists Andrew von Hirsch and Norval Morris, 
social theories of Foucault and Loci Wacquant rooted in Marxism, and 
defenses of restorative and therapeutic justice.  But the recent theorists 
worry most about how to maintain their own coherence and 
differentiation; their feints against fact-based challenges are chiefly 
rhetorical flourishes or abstract gestures meant to appeal to 
intellectualism.  But with Tonry’s admonitions in mind, the real story of 
modern punishment jurisprudence is not just the rise of any one school 
but an insularity whereby theorists worry mostly about their own 
internal coherence or about their conceptual differentiation from others’ 
theories; theorists’ feints in the direction of fact-based challenges to 
their theories are chiefly rhetorical or abstract gestures meant to shore 
up claims of internal coherence.  Moreover, their attempts to proffer 
justifying or even explanatory theories of punishment prove orthogonal 
to the key social, political, and economic questions about mass 
incarceration and deserve major emphasis.  Retributivism is the best 
example. 
                                                                                                                                          
pointed out, highly structured sentencing by itself is neutral as to punitiveness in terms of a 
bias away from probation toward prison or the length of sentences.  Kevin R. Reitz, Don’t 
Blame Determinacy: U.S. Incarceration Growth Has Been Driven by Other Forces, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 1787, 1798–99 & fig.3 (2006). 
101. Tonry, Introduction, supra note 5, at 11–12. 
102. See id. at 4, 16–18. 
103. Sheldon Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARV. L. REV. 453, 476 
(1928), reprinted in SHELDON GLUECK, CRIME AND CORRECTION: SELECTED PAPERS 72, 95 
(1952). 
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A.  Retribution and Retributivism 
It is too categorical to say that retributivists have ignored the real 
world of imprisonment.  They have, if anything, struggled to 
accommodate worldly realities, but have done so in insular, abstract, 
and incomplete ways that smack more of concern for intellectual nuance 
and rigor than moral accountability for the social effects of a 
retributivist system.  They have failed to acknowledge, much less meet, 
the challenge that the mass-incarceration books declare—a challenge 
that requires a much deeper rethinking of what role jurisprudence 
should play and has played. 
1. Flavors of Contemporary Retributivism 
The recent voices of retributivism have been markedly varied.  
There are the avowed political conservatives like Ernest van den Haag, 
who almost vindictively denounces rehabilitation as feckless, invoking 
(or purporting to invoke) pure deontological concerns as a moral 
catharsis for a misguided liberal moral relativism.104  There have been 
the strong but more nuanced and nonpolemical voices of retributivism 
such as Michael Moore, who has worked to reconcile retributivism with 
the principle known as moral realism by tying the supposed 
deontological notion of moral desert with a kind of naturalist human 
psychology.105  There have been liberal versions of retributivism that 
embrace it as an antidote to modern instrumental economic thinking.  
These include Dan Markel (whose “Confrontational Conception of 
Retribution” promotes retributivism in service to his professed political 
ideals of “moral accountability for unlawful actions; . . . equal liberty 
under law; and . . . democratic self-defense”)106 and Antony Duff (whose 
liberal communitarian version of retributivism aims to induce 
repentance and reconciliation).107  Also prominent among these liberal 
                                                          
104. Ernest van den Haag, The Death Penalty Once More, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 
967–72 (1985).  Consider this example: “Human beings are human because they can be held 
responsible, as animals cannot be.  In that Kantian sense the death penalty is a symbolic 
affirmation of the humanity of both victim and murderer.”  Id. at 972. 
105. See generally MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW (1997).  For an argument that Moore struggles unsuccessfully to reconcile his 
strong view of retributivism with the deterministic implications of naturalism, see Thomas W. 
Clark, Against Retribution, 3 HUM. NATURE REV. 466 (2003) (reviewing MOORE, supra). 
106. Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of 
Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 426–27 
(2005). 
107. R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY, at xviii (2001). 
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and nonpolemical retributivists are those like Herbert Morris,108 who 
offer notions of retribution tied to somewhat Rawlsian notions of 
fairness; others offer contractarian theories of government,109 or, like 
Joel Feinberg, argue that retributivism serves a function of reinforcing 
the moral solidarity of society.110 
In all its forms, the revival of retributivism has entailed a 
recommitment to deontological values that put individual responsibility 
at the moral center of criminal law.  But a consistent problem with those 
purporting to invoke deontological retributivism is that they often lack 
the courage of full deontology, and, as I will suggest below, the current 
state of retributivist scholarship is all about the degree of 
consequentialism that retributivism should incorporate.  One of the 
central figures of retributivism, Michael Moore, strongly declares that 
we have a duty to punish according to retributivist principles,111 and yet 
he regularly issues key qualifiers to the notion that desert is a sufficient 
condition for punishment: 
 
Within the set of conditions constituting intelligible reasons to 
punish, the retributivist asserts, desert is sufficient, i.e., no other 
of these conditions is necessary.  Of course other conditions 
outside the set of conditions constituting intelligible reasons to 
punish may also be necessary to a just punishment, such as the 
condition that the punishment not violate any non-forfeited 
rights of an offender.112 
 
Thus, Moore has been described as a “threshold deontologist,” i.e., 
he would allow the deontic duty to punish to yield to some variance 
                                                          
108. See HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 32 (1976). 
109. See MICHAEL DAVIS, TO MAKE THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME: ESSAYS IN 
THE THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7–9 (1992). 
110. JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF 
RESPONSIBILITY 98–105 (1970).  An interesting theme in retributivism that has produced 
some very thoughtful commentary recently is the issue of “subjectivism.”  This concept 
considers whether adjusting punishments to the likely degree or pain that a particular 
individual or type of person will experience is a fairer way of ensuring desert than an 
objective approach.  For a fine treatment, see Adam J. Kolber, Essay, The Subjective 
Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009).  I would immunize this work 
from the charge of ignoring mass incarceration because it honestly operates at a rarefied level 
of moral philosophy. 
111. MOORE, supra note 105, at 91 (asserting that moral desert is both a necessary and 
sufficient basis for punishment). 
112. Id. at 173 (emphasis omitted). 
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based on the moral gravity of the offense or the magnitude of 
countervailing factors.113  In a somewhat different vein is the highly 
influential retributivist Andrew von Hirsch.  Usually a harsh polemicist 
committed to debunking what he considers the laughable flaws of 
utilitarian rationales for punishment, von Hirsch sometimes adopts a 
defensive tone in arguing for ease of administration as a key 
comparative virtue of retributivism.114  Indeed, von Hirsch reveals an 
intellectual anxiety common to even strong retributivists by avoiding 
references to “retribution” in favor of “desert.”115 
In this regard, von Hirsch somewhat aligns with Paul Robinson and 
John Darley, who acknowledge the impossibility of retributivism as a 
purely desert-focused basis for determining the proper punishment for 
an act but insist that common moral intuition at least supplies a reliable 
metric for the ordinal measurement of punishment.  Moreover, they 
argue that obeying consensus moral instincts has the great instrumental 
value of encouraging respect for the criminal law—something the 
authors somewhat awkwardly tie to a refined version of general 
deterrence.116 
                                                          
113. See Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
815, 850 & n.96 (2007). 
114. See generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF 
PUNISHMENTS (1976).  Von Hirsch concedes that sometimes retribution leads to shorter 
sentences than were frequent in the 1970s, but he insists that the solution to equating 
punishment and desert and to economizing on prison costs is a literal and public inflection of 
pain.  Thus, he argues that pain is a necessary condition of justice and denies such liberal 
shibboleths as the idea that the prisoner has right of integrity over his own body.  See id.; see 
also GRAEME NEWMAN, JUST AND PAINFUL: A CASE FOR CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF 
CRIMINALS 19, 33 (2d ed. 1995) (explaining von Hirsch’s arguments and the “confusion about 
the use of pain in criminal punishment”). 
115. VON HIRSCH, supra note 114, at 45–46. 
116. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 
457 (1997).  Robinson and Darley state: 
 
In fact, in a society as diverse as ours, the criminal law may be the only society-wide 
mechanism that transcends cultural and ethnic differences. . . .  
. . .  If it earns a reputation as a reliable statement of what the community, 
given sufficient information and time to reflect, would perceive as condemnable, 
people are more likely to defer to its commands as morally authoritative and as 
appropriate to follow in those borderline cases in which the propriety of certain 
conduct is unsettled or ambiguous in the mind of the actor. 
Id.; see also John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 
24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 676 (2000) (finding that sentencing intuitions of the public 
focus on just deserts).  Robinson has suggested that there are actually three major types of 
retributivism, or “desert.”  In addition to “empirical desert” there is “vengeful desert,” which 
aligns punishment with the amount of harm the offender causes, and “deontological desert,” 
where punishment is determined by the absolute degree of the moral wrongfulness of the 
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If von Hirsch’s threshold model suggests a somewhat ambivalent 
commitment to retributivism, the Robinson–Darley approach raises 
more serious problems.  At first glance it is an effort to salvage 
retributivism from charges of hyper-abstraction by rooting moral views 
in popular consensus, or, more modestly, a search for some reliable 
benchmark for otherwise elusive deontological judgments.  But their 
work exemplifies how retributivism purports to accommodate or 
confront social reality while mostly appropriating a small part of that 
reality for purposes of internal rationalization.  And in that regard, note 
its strange acknowledgment of endogeneity.  Criminal law will be more 
efficacious if the populace finds its moral views reflected in the penal 
system.  But the endogeneity runs deeper than they acknowledge, since 
their approach invites democratic populism to endorse any current 
system as retributively just and thereby promote its continual self-
reinforcement. 
Perhaps the most important contemporary example of ambivalent 
retributivism is the so-called “limiting retributivism” associated with 
Norval Morris117 and which has also been called “hybrid retributivism.”  
This concept is often traced to H.L.A. Hart’s distinction between 
retributivism as a general justification for punishment and retributivism 
as method of distributing punishment,118 with the acceptance of the 
former and rejection of the latter.  Hence retributivism becomes a 
necessary but insufficient condition for punishment of individuals, and 
an eclectic reliance on consequences of punishment can help determine 
the right sanction under the maximum permitted by the retributivist 
measure.  This limiting retributivism has become what might be 
described as the politically correct version of retributivism, the liberal 
shibboleth relied on by the new Model Penal Code of Sentencing.119  In 
his rationale for the new MPC, reporter Kevin Reitz laments the failures 
of incapacitation and rehabilitation and declares the need to 
accommodate retribution, because in recent years even 
 
retributive theory has advanced far in both application and 
acceptance.  Reflection suggests that moral bases for punishment 
                                                                                                                                          
offense.  Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, 
Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 146–50 (2008). 
117. See NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974). 
118. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW 9 (1968). 
119. Kevin R. Reitz, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Plan for 
Revision, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 525, 528 (2002) (invoking Norval Morris’s idea of 
retributivism supplying upper and lower limits for a particular crime). 
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will be present in any punishment system administered by 
human beings, and such impulses can hardly be eradicated 
through legislation.  Indeed, some theorists posit that retribution 
is an affirmative, morally-required foundation for criminal 
sanctions.120 
 
As Reitz lays it out, one of limiting retributivism’s chief benefits is 
that it suggests a proportional ordering of severity; within the 
retributivist range, “utilitarian goals such as rehabilitation and 
incapacitation may be given rein to operate.”121  Reitz’s language seems 
to emphasize the retributivist rationale and treat consequentialist 
concerns as subordinate qualifiers.  But in concept, if threshold 
retributivism presumptively relies on desert (but qualifies it to account 
for certain consequences), the MPC’s retributivism points in an almost 
opposite direction.122 
2. The Standard Criticisms 
The resurgence of retributivism in legal academy has (not 
surprisingly) provoked spirited challenges to its premises and 
implications.  These challenges are powerful, and yet, with barely any 
exceptions,123 even when they attack retributivism for disconnection 
from social reality they acquiesce in a narrow view of that social reality 
so as to ignore mass incarceration. 
Of the traditional attacks on retributivism, some have argued that 
retributivists are fatally ambiguous or evasive about what exactly 
retributivism purports to be and to do: whether it is a strictly moral 
concept or a designedly legal concept; whether it is mandatory or 
permissive; whether it is meant to guide the level of punishment inflicted 
or just provide a foundational moral justification for the very existence 
of the practice of punishment; and whether it justifies limits on an 
otherwise utilitarian deployment of punishment or instead is just a one-
way ratchet to justify harsher penalties than society might choose on 
utilitarian or other grounds.124  Others have focused on why it is logically 
                                                          
120. Id. at 555–56 (footnote omitted). 
121. Id. at 556. 
122. See Cahill, supra note 113, at 836 (arguing that retributivism should be the 
justification for punishment, constrained by utilitarian limits, whereas the Model Penal Code 
looks to retributivism as a limit on consequentialist goals). 
123. But see infra notes 171–174 (discussing Edward Rubin’s views on limiting 
retributivism). 
124. See Christopher, supra note 4, at 865–67. 
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impossible to achieve because of two major social facts: the scarcity of 
governmental resources and the fallibility of human judgment. 
The modern classic of criticism in this genre is David Dolinko’s 
Three Mistakes of Retributivism.125  Dolinko begins by laying out the 
retributivists’ claim to moral advantage over proponents of instrumental 
punishment theories: that retributivism gives offenders exactly the 
punishment they “deserve” for their wrongful deeds, and hence never 
“uses” them, in a Kantian sense, by punishing them more than they 
deserve in order to serve some other social end.126  That claim, Dolinko 
argues, rests on three fundamental errors.  The first is the failure to see 
that retributivism itself “uses” individuals in precisely the same way, 
when it deploys concrete systems of punishment knowing that they are 
fallible, and therefore knowingly accepting the occasional punishment of 
the innocent in order to ensure that the guilty get what they deserve.127  
The second is the belief that we can come up with some objective 
measure of “just deserts” that allows us to match the punishment 
perfectly to the crime.128  As Dolinko shows, the purportedly objective 
scales of “desert” that retributivists have come up with are wholly 
circular or dependent on positive criminal law policy that itself cannot 
meet the test of perfect objectivity.129  The third is the belief that in 
giving individuals the punishment they “deserve,” we are expressing 
respect for them in a Kantian sense.130  To put it differently, we 
disrespect persons when we take into account various mitigating factors 
in setting the level of punishment or seek to advance rehabilitative 
goals, because we thereby assume that the criminal is not a fully 
autonomous individual responsible for his own choices and actions.131 
To be sure, there are some defenses of retributivism that might seem 
to finesse these question altogether.  One is to say that retributivism is 
inherently conceived solely to determine the proper sanction for 
individuals, not for wholesale classes of offenders.132  But that 
definitional defense seems more descriptive than normative, and hence 
fecklessly evasive.  A related defense is to ascribe deontic duties to 
                                                          
125. David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623 (1992). 
126. Id. at 1624–25, 1627, 1630. 
127. Id. at 1632. 
128. Id. at 1635–36. 
129. See id. at 1637–38; see also H.L.A. HART, supra note 118, at 233. 
130. See Dolinko, supra note 125, at 1642. 
131. Id. at 1642–43. 
132. See Cahill, supra note 113, at 819 & n.13 (summarizing views that the standard 
method of most retributivists is to rely on contrived hypotheticals to test their rationales). 
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different stages of a system.  Thus, Michael Moore himself posits that we 
can define deontic duty as only governing intentional actions in regard 
to punishment, and not be responsible for unintentional, even 
foreseeable, outcomes.133  Thus, a government system can justify its 
criminal justice system on a general deontic basis; it can also expect 
system actors making individual and situational decisions (police or 
judges) to follow deontic duty; but it can immunize from deontic duty 
the designers of institutional subsystems because they have to take 
account of resource constraints.134  But these efforts by retributivists to 
find a harmonious relationship with consequentialism, at least when 
done at this level of abstraction, have provoked one wise critic, Mitchell 
Berman, to suggest that  retributivists in effect “get over it” by accepting 
the pointlessness of any distinction in the first place.135  Berman instead 
suggests a modest but more workable distinction among degrees and 
forms of retributivist acquiescence in instrumentalism.136 
3. Retributivism and the Economists 
Much of the recent criticism, and self-criticism, of the retributivist 
revival has involved discussion of whether retributivism can find any 
possible harmony with the law-and-economics movement—a movement 
inclined to stress deterrence as the logical purpose of the criminal 
sanction.  Richard Posner and other law-and-economics scholars have 
generally dismissed retributivism in derogatory terms, as if those with a 
                                                          
133. Michael S. Moore, Four Reflections on Law and Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1523, 1552 & n.79 (2007). 
134. Id.  “Choice sets” of institutional designers who must allocate scarce resources fall 
outside the scope of deontic obligations.  Id. 
135. See Mitchell N. Berman, Two Kinds of Retributivism, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 433, 434 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011).  
Berman argues that almost any supposedly deontic value can be recharacterized in terms of 
its instrumental value.  Id. at 442 & n.24.  Berman focuses on Moore’s and others’ promotion 
of retributivism or desert as “an intrinsic good” and then notes that they could not possibly 
believe that deontological value is the only intrinsic good, else the overall virtue of any state 
of affairs would equal the amount of punishment of guilt that occurs, regardless of other 
social virtues.  Id. at 439. 
136. Berman concludes as follows: 
 
The worry, then, is not that the divide between ‘retributivist instrumentalism’ and 
‘non-retributivist instrumentalism’ is false, but that it is arbitrary.  If we were 
disposed to draw a binary classification within instrumentalist theories of 
punishment, we could just as well do it between welfarist and non-welfarist 
instrumentalism or deontological and non-deontological instrumentalism. 
Id. at 443. 
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utilitarian approach to the world find it an alien life-form.137  Although 
he has, perhaps begrudgingly, considered the idea of the taste for 
retribution as a revealed preference that can be factored into utility,138 
Posner has mostly argued that any concern for moral desert produces 
results sharply at odds with rational efforts to reduce crime—sometimes 
over-punishing and sometimes underpunishing.139 
Now a new strand of law-and-economics has considered the 
possibility that retributivism can win harmony with the constraining 
force of social fact.  I will briefly review some of the variations within 
this movement.  But to telegraph my punch on this development: the 
key factor this approach looks to is indeed constraint—but it is a 
misapprehended or even fictitious notion of constraint—the supposed 
constraint of limited resources in our political economy to punish in 
proportion to the degree of deserved punishment.  This constraint has a 
corollary in the new law-and-economics approach to retribution—the 
institutional imperfections and agency costs in the systems of 
investigation and adjudication might also contribute to 
underpunishment.  And I argue that if we accept Bruce Western’s and 
others’ findings about mass incarceration, these allusions to social fact 
have become tragically beside the point. 
We can start with the most optimistic, even Panglossian, approach—
that of Donald Wittman.140  Wittman implicitly calls on retributivists to 
realize that they cannot have all that they want, but he still argues that 
they can adjust to the real world by sensibly optimizing in the face of 
these limitations.  The premise is simply that retribution is a good thing 
and thus can be optimized like any other good thing, so that limitations 
on its availability are no more of a sacrifice than is true of any other 
                                                          
137. Posner addressed retributivism in a 1980 article, characterizing it as immoral and 
irrational, or at least as primitive and nonrational.  See Richard A. Posner, Retribution and 
Related Concepts of Punishment, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 80–81 (1980).  He does endorse its 
social function in primitive and early societies, in which it may temper the desire of private 
acts of vengeance, but dismisses its usefulness in modern societies, in which the function of 
law enforcement is assumed by the state.  Id. at 75–76.  Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, in 
their treatise promoting a purely welfarist purpose for legal decision-making, condemn 
retributivism as fundamentally unfair.  LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS 
VERSUS WELFARE 3, 9 (2002). 
138. Some legal economists have been more willing than Posner to accept a taste for 
retribution as a significant and independent factor in the utilitarian calculus.  See Alvin K. 
Klevorick, Legal Theory and the Economic Analysis of Torts and Crimes, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
905, 919 (1985). 
139. See Posner, supra note 137, at 82 (describing a system of punishment based on 
retaliation and vengeance). 
140. Donald Wittman, Punishment as Retribution, in 4 THEORY & DECISION 209 (1974). 
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social good.  Wittman takes retributivism as calling for punishment as 
close to the fully deserved sanction-per-bad-act as possible, so that full 
punishment is “optimal.”141  But generally recognizing the limited 
resources and imperfections of the criminal justice system, including 
erroneous judgments and agency costs among institutional actors, he 
assumes that there is an exogenously determined fitting punishment for 
each crime, so that punishing all offenders at this level maximizes 
justice.142 
Consider the terms in which this bridging effort is attempted: 
Wittman is explicitly indifferent to the means by which the degree of 
punishment that meets retributive standards is determined.143  He then 
establishes a utility function whereby justice declines as punishment 
exceeds or falls short of this level, and his model analyzes the 
comparative degrees of injustice traceable to these deviations, whether 
over or underpunishing, or failing to punish all criminals, or punishing 
the innocent.144  In effect, he writes a guide for how the rational 
retributivist should act.  At the most general level, if punishment is just, 
then the more individuals that are punished the less justice there is.145  
But over or underpunishment for the relevant crime in terms of severity 
and degrees of failure to punish the guilty all affect our efforts to 
maximize justice.  Thus, if a punishment is egregiously severe, then there 
is more justice when fewer are punished.146  He accepts the “slack” of the 
system because of the inefficiencies caused by multiple agents in the 
process, and it increases as actual punishment goes down.147  In 
summary, if punishment is too big, as it increases it lowers the optimal 
                                                          
141. Id. at 211–12. 
142. Id. at 215. 
143. Id. at 211. 
144. Id. at 210–26. 
145. Id. at 218. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 215–16.  In more detail, “[i]f the punishment is less than the optimal . . . , the 
smaller the punishment the less the difference in justice between punishing many and a few of 
[the guilty].”  Id. at 215.  But, “[i]f punishment is less than . . . [optimal], then the more . . . 
punished, the greater the justice.”  Id. at 216.  “If the punishment is greater than [deserved], 
the greater the punishment, the greater the justice of punishing a few of the known criminals 
minus the justice of punishing many of them.”  Id. at 218.  So “as punishment increases [above 
optimal], the optimal number of criminals not punished increases.”  Id.  Wittman even cites 
some empirical evidence: When Virginia arguably overpunished drunk driving with a 
mandatory loss of license, the result was jury nullification.  Id.  By contrast, he predicts that in 
states that reduce marijuana possession from a felony to a misdemeanor, thereby adjusting 
the punishment to what is perceived as deserved, the conviction rate will go up.  Id. 
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number of those punished, and when fewer of the known criminals are 
punished, the less the optimal punishment.148 
While most retributivists (and deontologists in general) would be 
uncomfortable with the idea of even a vague “measure” of justice, 
Wittman’s approach, if extended modestly, would enable analysis of the 
trade-offs involved with retributivist punishment. 
Next, in his aptly titled article Retributive Justice in the Real World, 
Michael Cahill recognizes the conceptual difficulty of bridging 
retributivism and utility, but he ends up suggesting that Wittman’s 
optimism can be rendered operational through careful and flexible 
adjustments in the schemes for distributing retribution.149  In proffering 
his notion of “consequentialist retributivism,” Cahill virtually mocks 
absolutist retributivism as a quixotic notion that is forced to engage in 
self-limiting rationalizations to escape its inability to deal with human 
error and scarce resources, and institutional agency costs.150  And as for 
threshold retributivism, he decries it as abstract and metaphoric, 
incapable of determining at what point in a real system of criminal 
justice we can determine when the retributivism principle must arise to 
rein in the forces of utilitarianism.151  Overall, he views most 
retributivism as too abstract to help us judge a criminal justice system 
because it can at best tell us about the optimal punishment in individual 
cases but is likely to do so only in the extreme cases at either end—from 
torture to trivial cases. 
In Cahill’s view, retributivism is a justifying principle of punishment 
that insists that certain acts be punished and that posits at least degrees 
and types of punishment for these acts.  But Cahill would redefine 
retribution as a general goal of punishment, not an obligation to 
punish.152  He says that we can thereby see retribution as an intrinsic 
virtue to maximize as best we can, so we can create a fungible amount of 
retribution that can be doled out according to conventional means of 
                                                          
148. Id. at 218–19. 
149. See Cahill, supra note 113, at 836. 
150. Id. at 828, 857.  As he describes absolutist retributivism, it would at most take into 
account the costs of apprehension and the risk of error in an effort to keep the net of 
deserved punishment as wide as possible.  Id. at 848.  Moreover, in his view, absolute 
retributivism believes that the degree of severity of a crime is irrelevant to the obligation to 
punish it.  Thus, when resources are scarce, the absolute retributivist will choose to at least 
maximize the sheer number of crimes punished and will thereafter go after those easiest to 
apprehend and most likely guilty—which may turn out to be such low-level criminals as 
shoplifters.  Id. at 849–50. 
151. Id. at 858. 
152. See id. at 851, 868. 
15 - WEISBERG (DO NOT DELETE) 7/18/2012  1:23 PM 
1234 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:1203 
rational government planning in the face of scarcity.153  In Cahill’s view, 
the key step may involve taking an “agent-neutral” rather than an 
“agent-relative” approach to retributivism.154  Under an agent-relative 
approach, where act and individual must be the measure for the right 
punishment, we cannot escape the category of questions and 
externalities that White poses, and the system is stuck with lumpy 
inefficiencies that may thwart retribution.  But in an agent-neutral 
approach, we can aggregate individual “amounts” of desert into a whole, 
and then do a cost–benefit analysis to ensure that we are getting the 
maximum possible amount of punishment or “desert-based 
punishment” at the lowest possible cost.155 
Thus, for Cahill, retributivism can take on questions of 
implementation while also fending off possible criticism that mutual 
contingency of various stages of enforcement and punishment doom the 
coherence of the retributivist program.  So long as we can stipulate that 
a legislatively assigned punishment can fairly represent the deserved 
punishment for a crime, we can then proceed to some simple 
hypothetical calculations, and can do so by stages of enforcement.  So 
for example, suggests Cahill, if we look at the stage of police 
investigation and apprehension, we can work up figures for the cost of 
apprehending an offender, then the number of offenders, then the likely 
false-positive error rate, and we then calculate the cost per “unit of 
deserved punishment” and ask the police to find ways to maximize it.156  
The police need not get caught up with such questions as whether to 
give all offenders some punishment while sacrificing some of the 
punishment they deserve, or any other distribution or triage formula 
which may also sacrifice individual desert.  When prosecutors inherit 
these police choices they can perform a parallel calculation.  Even in the 
face of such possible problems created by the police, Cahill’s good news 
is that the legislature can holistically coordinate all these stages, for 
example, by defining sentences so as to anticipate and account for the 
allocation decisions by various actors.157  He claims that his model offers 
both suppleness and precision because it can at least consider such 
choices as the following: whether to emphasize severity or certainty; 
                                                          
153. Id. at 851. 
154. Id. at 833. 
155. Id. at 855. 
156. Id. at 843. 
157. Id. at 856.  Thus, the legislature can set sentences higher if it is likely that 
prosecutors will engage in aggressive plea-bargaining and perhaps also legislating procedural 
rules to govern police and prosecutorial choices.  Id. 
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whether to aim for wider distribution of punishment as opposed to 
triage; whether we should exhaust maximum punishment for serious 
crimes before looking further down the culpability ladder; or whether 
the optimizing device should focus error rates and apprehension costs 
per category of crime regardless of its egregiousness.158 
In rebuttal to these efforts, Kenneth Avio insists that the 
retributivist–utilitarian relationship exhibits a deep conceptual divide 
that cannot be healed.  Avio reviews various efforts to marry 
retributivism to utilitarian economics but concludes that “a plausible 
efficiency-based rationale for finite punishment remains to be 
articulated” and that “[p]unishments that simultaneously optimize and 
are deserved . . . may not exist.”159  He runs through the versions of 
retributivism that purport to accommodate welfare or scarcity, but he 
rejects each one as incoherent.  He takes on the hybrid retributivism 
inspired by Rawls and H.L.A. Hart,160 and later rearticulated by Sharon 
Byrd: adherence to a strong deontic duty to punish but positing that 
criminal law can be consequentialist in its overall purpose—to threaten 
punishment so as to deter—but retributive in meting out punishment for 
individual acts.161  As usually understood, this hybrid theory amounts to 
the standard deterrence approach constrained by negative retributivism 
(ruling out intentional punishment of the innocent, as well as 
disproportionate penalties).  But because of the equation of desert to 
harm and the practical impossibility of consistent (much less full) 
enforcement, this combination, in Avio’s view, is a conceptual failure.162  
For example, while few deterrence advocates would endorse deliberate 
punishment of innocent persons, they do recommend disproportionately 
high punishments to compensate for the uncertainty of apprehension 
and prosecution (a standard result from the economics of crime).  But 
negative retributivists condemn excessive punishment of the guilty as 
                                                          
158. Id. at 821, 833–35. 
159. K.L. Avio, Economic, Retributive and Contractarian Conceptions of Punishment, 12 
L. & PHIL. 249, 259, 268 (1993). 
160. Id. at 262–68. 
161. Id.; see also B. Sharon Byrd, Kant’s Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in Its Threat, 
Retribution in Its Execution, 8 L. & PHIL. 151 (1989). 
162. Treating hybrid retributivism as an effort to salvage a real world role for 
retributivism, Avio insists that given the impossibility of punishing all deserving offenders in 
accordance with the harm they cause and the various kinds of slippage within the system in 
catching and convicting offenders in the first place, the logical demand of deterrence—that it 
punish at the marginal level of sanction to the offender to match the marginal gain or harm of 
the crime—is a fantasy in a real world criminal justice system.  Avio, supra note 159, at 268. 
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well as punishment of the innocent, and so would prohibit these 
artificially increased penalties.  In sum: 
 
[P]unishment that is retributive in its execution (i.e., equal in 
severity to the direct harm experienced by the victim) is 
generally not credible as an effective threat as perceived by 
rational prospective offenders.  [Hybrid retributivists] 
insufficiently appreciate that the threat of punishment arises 
from, and is communicated by, actually apprehending, 
convicting, and punishing offenders. . . . 
. . . . 
. . .  Kantian retributive principles could not be taken 
seriously if they were over-ridden by the need to attain a degree 
of deterrence necessary for a consequentialist justification of 
punishment.163 
 
Thus, Avio finds the reconciliation of retributivism and utility in 
criminal justice virtually dead on arrival.  That is, he stays within the 
realm of fairly abstract theory, never venturing into the world of social 
fact.  But one can infer from his views that since retributivism cannot 
harmonize with any approach to punishment meant to enhance utility he 
would hardly be surprised that modern retributivism seems irrelevant to 
mass incarceration.  Or he might even argue an excessive commitment 
to retributivism might even explain mass incarceration. 
A subtle tonal variant on Avio’s skepticism comes from Mark 
White.164  White acknowledges that there are ways of optimizing the 
amount of retribution a society exercises, and thus is somewhat less 
concerned with abstract coherence than Avio.165  In contrast to 
Wittman’s “no problem” attitude, White treats optimizing efforts as 
tragically, though not futilely, entailing sacrifices of justice, and his 
premise is that a certain category of dilemmas are the true measure of 
the sacrifice.166  White’s predicate is that retributivists can purport to 
retain a modicum of purity in the system by applying the principles 
solely to the punishment of the convicted, relieving the agents of 
apprehension and prosecution of any obligation to maximize 
                                                          
163. Id. at 267–68. 
164. See Mark D. White, Retributivism in a World of Scarcity, in THEORETICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 253 (Mark D. White ed., 2009). 
165. See id. at 266. 
166. Id. at 254. 
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retribution.167  But is it the case that only punishment of convicted 
persons must adhere to retributivist principles, so that apprehension and 
prosecution, which influence the probability of punishment, to be 
optimized according to a purely utilitarian model?  If so, the interactive 
effects of these differential approaches would be complex and 
unpredictable.  For example, if retributive punishments for major crimes 
are very high, the resulting higher prison costs might drain resources 
from police and prosecutors and thus disserve crime prevention, 
although these high penalties might have the secondary benefit of 
increasing deterrence and thereby saving the budgets for these earlier 
stages.  But if we expand the domain of retributivism to cover both 
punishment and prosecution, would we then not only have to punish all 
convicted persons rightly for their crimes but also ensure that we 
prosecute all probably guilty persons—and no innocent ones?  Or do we 
choose a theory of retribution that allows actors at various stages to 
stress probability (frequency) of conviction rather than severity of the 
charge or possible penalty?  In the end, White fears that any attempt to 
accommodate the cost or uncertainty of apprehension or prosecution 
undermines the purity of the culpability measure.168 
4. A Critique of the Critiques 
The attacks on retributivism for the alleged incoherence of its own 
internal logic are well-established.  Of course, none of the other 
purposes of punishment can utterly free themselves of internal 
incoherence, so the concern for abstract purity may be unfair.  But even 
if we proceed to somewhat less abstract concerns like the possibility of a 
metric of proportionality, through the perspective of Western’s book, 
retributivism seems feckless and irrelevant.  There is no point in 
discussing the abstractions and nuances of proportionality when in some 
rough sense American punishment is so wildly disproportionate to 
crime, whether we focus on crime and punishment in the collective sense 
or in regard to the specific misconduct of individuals.  There is little 
point in discussing the moral desert of particular acts when in some 
rough sense, we are long past the point of marginally identifying bad 
acts to punish but instead use our penal laws to add new tranches of 
offenders to a vast and self-reinforcing status.  A key fallibility of 
retributivism lies not in the failure to fine-tune adjustments of 
punishment to desert, but in the close to universal mismatching of crime 
                                                          
167. Id. at 266–67. 
168. Id. at 269. 
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and punishment, as the formal sentence is multiplied in severity by the 
aggregated earnings penalty169 and lifetime recidivism that imprisonment 
produces.  Punishment ostensibly based on bad acts may have so 
thwarted the social and behavioral development of inmates that it 
creates a demographic status that in turn becomes the cause of further 
incarceration. 
On the other hand, as for some of these newer critiques that demand 
that retributivism account for social fact, let me repeat the punch I 
telegraphed earlier: These critiques of—or corrections to—retributivism 
that limit the challenge of social reality to resource constraint (or 
procedural imperfection) stay far on the safe side of the challenge of 
modern mass incarceration.  There is little point in worrying about 
scarcity of prosecutorial and correctional resources when, given this 
disproportion, we spend an amount of money so far in excess of what 
might be needed to sensibly address America’s demonstrable crime 
problem that our resources might just as well be viewed as infinite.  For 
many years this observation has had a kind of technical economic truth 
to it, given the tendency of states to use debt-delaying bond-issue 
financing schemes for prison construction that placed corrections off the 
books for normal budgetary purposes and thus outside the regular realm 
of political discussion.170  But less technically, there is no point in 
worrying about whether American criminal justice is cogently motivated 
by the purpose of retribution when the effects outrun any ostensible 
purpose in the first place.  Put another way, the system finesses the 
scarcity problem by externalizing so much of its cost on the very group it 
punishes, both in terms of the penalties for individual prisoners and the 
collateral damage done to those on whom they depend. 
Nor do the sensible-sounding compromises of “limiting 
retributivism” salvage this form of critique.171  Aiming directly at the 
embedding of this in the new MPC of sentencing, Edward Rubin, who is 
rare even among critics of retributivism for suggesting it is partly to 
blame for mass incarceration, attacks on several fronts.172  First, Rubin 
attacks the predicate notion of the modern story—that retribution at the 
very least supplied a reliable metric for punishment that would correct 
the subjectivity, hypercomplexity, and nonuniformity associated with 
rehabilitation.  He insists that it is a phantom argument to say that 
                                                          
169. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 125–26. 
170. See Kevin Pranis, Doing Borrowed Time: The High Cost of Back-Door Prison 
Finance, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 2008, at 1, 1–3. 
171. See Rubin, supra note 92, at 18. 
172. Id. 
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desert supplies a reliable metric, since the moral judgment it entails may 
not be limited to supposedly well-defined acts, but rather may have to 
include many more contextual factors.173  Second, in a rare move in 
modern jurisprudence, Rubin notes that limiting retributivism cannot 
possibly be applied to justify the recidivist sentences that account for a 
significant portion of the incarceration rate in the United States today.  
But most importantly, he argues that the mantra of limited retributivism 
still gives aid and comfort to stronger retributivism as a valid 
overarching theory of punishment.  Indeed, despite the effort of modern 
retributivists to distinguish their favored philosophy from atavistic 
Hammurabian sentiments, it still “smolders with the spirit of revenge,” 
and proponents of limited retributivism delude themselves if they think 
that this taint can be “sanitized by philosophic argument.”174   
Rubin’s thesis is that overarching theories of punishment are 
themselves an enemy of reform, as evidenced by the overreaction to 
rehabilitation entailed by modern retributivism.  He argues that the 
rhetorical need to reject rehabilitation led its critics to understate its 
utility when they invoked the “nothing works” trope175 and to offer 
highly exaggerated complaints that rehabilitation posed a threat to the 
personality and autonomy of the offender.176  The result was to ignore its 
modest but crucial role in one arena—the arena of prison operation and 
the value of rehabilitationist principles in mitigating abusive prison 
conditions.177  A retributivist mindset among prison officials is not a 
healthy thing if it renders prison harsher—and is not even logically 
entailed by retributivist philosophy anyway.178 
                                                          
173. Id. at 33–34. 
174. Id. at 41. 
175. The phrase “nothing works” was made famous by sociologist Robert Martinson, 
especially in his highly visible article What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison 
Reform, PUB. INT., Spring 1974, at 22, 48.  Even just a few years after that article, other social 
scientists argued that the widespread absolutely negative view attributed to Martinson was a 
misreading of his research.  See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, “What Works?” Revisited: New 
Findings on Criminal Rehabilitation, 61 PUB. INT., Fall 1980, at 3, 3. 
176. Rubin, supra note 92, at 73–81. 
177. See id. at 66–82. 
178. Id.  As Rubin notes, proportionality, oddly enough, has the advantage of not being 
a theory of punishment.  Id. at 50.  It is what Nozick calls a side-constraint to make 
punishment fairer, regardless of whether the justifying motivation is some form of 
utilitarianism or anything else.  Id. at 33.  Indeed, Rubin thereby salvages the Robinson–
Darley theory from the charge that it lends aid and comfort to harsh retributivists by treating 
their view simply as an empirical way of assessing the political purchase of proportionality 
and thereby gaining consent of the governed to whatever the ruling punishment theory is.  See 
id. at 63–64.  And he adds with modest praise that the key advantage of proportionality of this 
sort is that American criminal justice now relies almost exclusively on incarceration, as for 
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A final critical perspective on modern retributivism comes from 
Jeffrie Murphy, in one of those rare essays that foundationally undoes 
the very logic of a philosophy of punishment by mere reference to the 
state of social fact.179  Murphy is concerned with one rationale for 
retributivism, the social contractarian notion that we have all implicitly 
consented to a governing moral code, but his perspective undermines 
the logic of retributivism more broadly.  He argues that social 
contractarianism’s premise is that people 
 
are viewed as being part of a community of shared values and 
rules.  The rules benefit all concerned and, as a kind of debt for 
the benefits derived, each man owes obedience to the rules.  In 
the absence of such obedience, he deserves punishment in the 
sense that he owes payment for the benefits.  For, as a rational 
man, he can see that the rules benefit everyone (himself 
included) and that he would have selected them in the original 
position of choice. 
 . . .  But to think that [this] applies to the typical criminal, 
from the poorer classes, is to live in a world of social and 
political fantasy. . . .  [T]hey certainly would be hard-pressed to 
name the benefits for which they are supposed to owe 
obedience.180 
 
Murphy’s challenge, which predates mass incarceration, is based on 
a general assumption of income inequality.  As Western’s book makes 
clear, the social facts of mass incarceration pose a challenge of a 
different order of magnitude: Is it possible to defend an ethos of 
individual responsibility when it is instantiated in a practice that has led 
to the mass production of ruined lives?  If the collateral social and 
economic consequences of incarceration are so profound and 
metastatically unpredictable, if they serve to multiply social and income 
inequality, perhaps the matching of punishment to crime has become a 
hopeless exercise.  If so, then the traditional critique that retribution 
must account for the fallibility of the institutions of justice misses the 
point that the work of Western and others teach. 
                                                                                                                                          
serious punishment, the arithmetic of time makes such judgment-sorting easier.  Id. at 50. 
179. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, in PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHY 
AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS READER 3 (A. John Simmons et al. eds., 1995). 
180. Id. at 26. 
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a.  Incapacitation 
Incapacitation would seem to be the least problematic of the 
rationales of punishment, both theoretically and empirically.  It rests on 
the obvious point that a person in prison cannot commit crimes outside 
of prison, and if we have decent information about the criminal 
proclivities of an offender, we can reasonably estimate the number of 
crimes prevented for a particular period of his life.  Moreover, for the 
same reason, among utilitarian rationales incapacitation seems 
especially harmonious with retribution, since what it accomplishes 
seems so closely allied to what the offender has done or is likely to do.  
Of course, things are not all that neat.  For one thing, it may be a matter 
of chance what particular offense sends an offender to prison; moreover, 
that particular offense may bear a weak relationship to the nature and 
frequency of crimes he is likely to do if set free, or to the length of time 
for which we can project his proclivities.  Worse yet, a sentence 
measured by those empirical speculations might bear little relation to 
what the polity would see as a fair punishment for that offense.  Indeed, 
these concerns cause worry that the argument for incapacitation does 
not easily distinguish away the knotty problem of “preventive 
detention,” where the triggering information about an offender’s 
proclivities might not be a convictable offense at all. 
The stock story of the recent politics of the incarceration boom 
focuses far more on retribution than incapacitation, but the common 
political rhetoric of “public safety” surely implies that incapacitation is 
salient in the minds of the polity.  And the most obvious challenge that 
mass incarceration poses to incapacitation is, as noted earlier, that the 
continuing post-1990 spike in imprisonment seems to have accounted 
for only a small fraction of the reduction in crime.  But the problems of 
incapacitation in a time of mass incarceration are still more complex. 
The incapacitation justification for punishment was briefly publicly 
ascendant in the 1970s, under the name of “selective incapacitation,” 
championed by the neoconservative James Q. Wilson.181  Responding to 
the crime wave of the era, Wilson argued that some humans had a 
certain irreducible proclivity to commit crimes that was immune to 
liberal do-good efforts to ameliorate the underlying social “causes” of 
crime.  Faced with this problem of original sin, the best the state could 
do was to isolate criminals from potential victims.  Wilson argued that 
incapacitation could rely on criminological evidence to identify the 
                                                          
181. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 156 (2d rev. ed. 1983). 
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likeliest criminals and likeliest recidivists, so that isolation could be 
keenly parsimonious.182 
Most of the criticism of Wilson attacked his key empirical premises.  
One complaint was about the quality of the social science predicting 
future criminality on the basis of conventional criteria of personality and 
past conduct, and that any machinery to implement such a scheme is 
likely to be too informal, error prone, and not self-correcting.183  
Another was that claims that altering prison rates to achieve “selective 
incapacitation” could reduce the crime rate grossly mismeasured the 
amount of incapacitation, failing to account for eras where vast numbers 
of antisocial people were held in mental hospitals.184  Another was about 
the “replacement effect,” the concern that the premise of selective 
incapacitation is flawed because the key variable affecting the number 
of crimes is not the number of criminally inclined people on the streets 
but the number of criminal opportunities.185 
These criticisms receive their richest empirical treatment from 
Zimring and Hawkins in their 1995 book precisely titled 
Incapacitation.186  But Zimring and Hawkins attack the premises and 
products of incapacitation in more foundational ways.  They review the 
strange shadow history of this concept in its relationship to the other 
purposes of punishment and its salience in academic debate generally.  
The gist of their argument is that selective incapacitation rose to some 
prominence not because it had much intellectual or empirical 
foundation, but because, along with deterrence, it served a default 
function: For utilitarians, it was the best rationale available to fill the 
breach when rehabilitation faltered.187  Indeed, the selective version of 
incapacitation theory won attention because it seemed so compellingly 
logical, found support in available episodic studies for those disinclined 
to do original research, seemed more demonstrable than deterrence, 
                                                          
182. Id. at 145–58 (examining the various studies and explaining that criminal justice 
“operates by trying to predict future behavior”). 
183. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational Punishment, 43 BUFF. L. 
REV. 689, 711 (1995); see also Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Characterizing Criminal 
Careers, 237 SCI. 985, 985 (1987) (describing the “considerable difficulty of observing directly 
individual crimes or tracking carefully the patterns of offending by individual criminals in 
order to collect reliable data”). 
184. See Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the 
Incarceration Revolution, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1755 & fig.1, 1760–61 (2006). 
185. See, e.g., KING ET AL., supra note 33, at 6 (explaining the replacement effect in the 
context of the drug market). 
186. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 92. 
187. Id. at 3–4. 
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and so was a mutual enabler with public safety policies.188  Zimring and 
Hawkins assert that promoters of selective incapacitation were awkward 
and hesitant in their research, rarely undertaking rigorous efforts to 
break down their data in terms of subcategories of criminals.189 
As a result, Zimring and Hawkins argue, beyond all the conceptual 
and empirical flaws in selective incapacitation, that the justifying 
rationales for incapacitation in general terms, as an overall animating 
purpose of punishment, have been neglected.190  Perhaps because it 
seemed mostly like a concession to the failure of rehabilitation,191 
perhaps because as a pure theory of punishment it has trouble finessing 
the problem of preventive detention, incapacitation has never been 
given general fundamental scrutiny.  As a result, incapacitation’s 
problems run well beyond the common attacks on Wilson’s promotion 
of it.  As Zimring and Hawkins point out, however, there have been 
numerous empirical studies of selective incapacitation, yet these studies 
have been remarkably episodic and noncumulative, and they have been 
“dialectical,” in the sense of one study aiming to attack another, rather 
than examining fundamental questions, and in some ways its proponents 
have proceeded more deductively than inductively.192  In terms of 
specific empirical problems, Zimring and Hawkins question the ability 
of criminologists to measure crime proclivity at any specific period.  Just 
to figure out how many crimes someone committed just before prison 
requires finessing problems with such unreliable data as retrospective 
official measurements and self-reporting surveys.  Even if we can get 
reliable information about this much-studied “window period” 
occurring just before incarceration, mathematically projecting forward 
from any such data is itself daunting, especially if the window period 
itself does not usefully predict crime frequency in the next immediate 
phase of the offender’s career.193 
As Zimring and Hawkins put it, incapacitation proponents tend to 
be entranced by the notion of a “fixed lambda” between the crime rate 
and the counterfactual crime rate absent prison, and do not consider the 
social contingency of such a counterfactual, paying far too little 
                                                          
188. Id. 
189. See id. at 97. 
190. Id. at 12–13.  Ironically, Bentham himself had briefly discussed incapacitation but 
viewed it fairly dismissively as a weak partner to general deterrence.  Id. at 19–21. 
191. Id. at 61. 
192. Id. at 38–41. 
193. Id. at 83, 88–91. 
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attention to modern theories of crime causation and motivation.194  
Moreover, the promoters of selective incapacitation ignored a 
worrisome array of types of endogeneity and interaction with other 
punishment rationales that incapacitation might entail.  For one thing, 
they did not address the problem that the police and other agents of the 
state are always themselves making predictions that will skew prison 
populations toward higher risks.  In addition, there is the problem of 
diminishing returns—marginal changes in imprisonment are always 
likely to focus on the least dangerous.  Thus, under any regime, given 
the uncontroversial necessity of imprisoning the most egregious 
criminals, and the nonincarceration of the least dangerous offenders, 
even a strong shift in Wilson’s direction is likely to work only at the 
margin of middle-level offenders such that it is unlikely to significantly 
affect the cost–benefit rationality of imprisonment.  Further, it is 
obvious that offending rates of low-level criminals may increase in 
response to shorter sentences because of decreased deterrence.195 
Finally, in both conceptual and empirical terms, the proponents have 
been clumsy in attempts to measure the costs that further crime would 
impose.  For example, Zimring and Hawkins say estimates of these costs 
avoided may be improbably high because of some of the proxies drawn 
from tort law.  Indeed, they acidly remark that if such proxies are to be 
used, then the most important incapacitation target in the United States 
may be drunk drivers.196 
Ultimately, Zimring and Hawkins view incapacitation as a backup 
utilitarian argument that, perhaps more than deterrence, was available 
as an abettor of harsher criminal laws, especially recidivist laws and 
prison expansion.  Indeed, incapacitation laid out the conceptual 
vocabulary that helped create law-and-order politics and Wilson’s work 
became part of a more general neoconservative turn in American 
intellectual culture in part because it so explicitly derided the individual 
psychology of social causation questions that modern social science has 
not accomplished much with.  In any event, whatever efficiency one 
might have hoped could be realized by better predictions of future 
criminality has been obliterated by mass incarceration.  In our recent 
politics of incarceration, little value has been placed on accurate 
predictions of recidivism.  It also moots those predictions, by creating 
social conditions that put all inmates at very high risk of an endless 
                                                          
194. Id. at 46. 
195. Id. at 36. 
196. See id. at 139, 141. 
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return cycle, whatever individual propensity to recidivism they might 
have shown in a different social context. 
A final irony is that when forced to serve as a generally justifying 
purpose of punishment, incapacitation cannot sustain its own integrity as 
a purpose.  Indeed, as it reverts to selectivity to save its integrity, the 
irony is that the narrow targeting of selective incapacitation law would 
seem to show that incapacitation is not the overall purpose.  Rather, it 
implicitly validates rehabilitation as a reverse default. 
Consider one more angle on the unstable boundary of incapacitation 
from Guyora Binder.197  Binder has eloquently argued that the social 
reality of prisoner-on-prisoner crime raises doubt about whether anyone 
could truly believe that incapacitation is the goal of incarceration.  The 
promoters of selective incapacitation must assume either that crime 
does not occur in prison, or prison crime simply does not count.  The 
former assumption has never been true, and in an era of overcrowding 
wrought by the spike in imprisonment, the limited research suggests that 
while sexual assault has garnered the most attention,198 the number of 
criminal-on-criminal assaults is extremely high.199  “The prevalence of 
prison violence raises the question whether incapacitation theory is truly 
concerned with reducing the risk of violent crime, or merely 
redistributing its risk from innocents to past offenders.”200  The position 
that only nonoffenders deserve protection from violence would seem to 
be a principle of retributive desert rather than utility.  Such segregation 
of offenders not only sets them apart from “society” physically—it also 
sets them apart from “society” symbolically, by implying that their 
welfare does not count in totaling up the welfare gains and losses from 
incarceration. 
                                                          
197. JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 56–58 (6th ed. 2008). 
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The reporting rates for sexual assault in prison may be less reliable than for non-sexual 
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Binder’s and Zimring and Hawkins’ insights about how 
incapacitation should be recharacterized as a mask over another 
rationale for punishment jibes with one of Zimring and Hawkins’ 
cautions about these rationales generally, 
 
that very often justifications for particular penal practices are 
produced after their implementation and are rationalizations of 
change rather than causes.  One counter to the notion that 
renewed emphasis on penal restraint caused larger numbers of 
prisoners is the possibility that the considerable growth in prison 
population was itself the cause of the voluminous rhetorical 
output that accompanied it.  These chicken-or-egg problems are 
frequently encountered when we seek to unravel the relationship 
between theory and practice in penal history, but they are not 
easier to resolve because of their frequent recurrence.201 
 
b.  General Deterrence 
If one looks to theoretical commentary on deterrence that parallels 
what we see on retribution (and the absence of which for incapacitation 
was noted by Zimring and Hawkins), there is not much.  No one doubts 
that preventing crime is a legitimate government goal, and so theoretical 
debates about general deterrence have usually been variants on the 
more general debate between retributivism and utilitarianism: Is it 
illegitimate to “use” a new offender for the purpose of deterring others 
where the degree of punishment to send the deterrent message exceeds 
the offender’s desert?  Of course, the field of theoretical law and 
economics, in the hands of such leaders as Steven Shavell and A. 
Mitchell Polinsky, has made a massive intellectual investment in the 
abstract modeling of marginal deterrent capacities of various types of 
sanctions.202  Occasionally, one sees a fresh framing of the foundational 
questions.  Notably, Anthony Ellis tries to ground deterrence as a 
species of collective self-defense against aggression by playing out the 
analogy to individual self-defense doctrine.203  He addresses a key 
conceptual problem: even if the state can plausibly threaten harm to 
deter offenses, that self-defense rationale does not obviously justify 
actually enforcing the punishment after the threat failed to deter the 
                                                          
201. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 92, at 72–73. 
202. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting 
of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–2 (1999). 
203. Anthony Ellis, A Deterrence Theory of Punishment, 53 PHIL. Q. 337, 337–38 (2003). 
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particular offender.204  So Ellis tries out some creative finessing of this 
issue, suggesting, for example, that in order to make the threat credible, 
the state must precommit and irreversibly prearrange to execute the 
punishment.205 
Such new forays into jurisprudence aside, the scholarship on general 
deterrence is all about refinements in the empirical technology needed 
to assess the deterrent effect.  That assessment faces daunting challenges 
in understanding psychology, but an old and still agreed-on standby in 
this area is that insofar as the evidence supports deterrence effects, 
certainty of punishment appears to have more effect than severity 
because it is more salient for people with manifest higher discount 
rates.206  But once we get past such general empirical observations, if we 
work with ostensible correlations of changes in actual punishment and 
crime rates, controlling the variables is massively complex.  Much of this 
work has been stuck in the perennial arena of the death penalty, where, 
despite occasional new claims of solid proof of marginal deterrent effect 
of executions, the limitations on the data have probably rendered the 
hypothesis unproved and may be ultimately unprovable.207  Sometimes 
other natural experiments arise, and the necessarily spotty and episodic 
studies of these events produce little clear evidence of a marginal 
deterrent effect.  Thus, David Lee and Justin McCrary took advantage 
of data about the change in punishment due to reaching adult status—a 
sharply discontinuous change in vulnerability to punishment readily 
                                                          
204. Id. at 338–39. 
205. Id. at 340–41.  Thom Brooks challenges Ellis’s theory for the imperfections of its 
analogy between the individual and the collective: that self-defense-based deterrence is 
irrelevant to nonviolent or victimless crimes, and that the excuse allowed for reasonable 
mistakes in individual self-defense would have to work as justifications at the collective level.  
In addition, complains Brooks, Ellis necessarily impurifies his deterrence theory with 
retributivism when he contrives the crime of “failing to heed a deterrent warning” and when 
he smuggles in a reasonableness limitation on the magnitude of the deterrent penalty.  Thom 
Brooks, On Ellis’s Deterrence Theory of Punishment, 92 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND 
SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 594, 594–96 (2004). 
206. See David P. Farrington et al., Changes in Crime and Punishment in America, 
England and Sweden Between the 1980s and 1990s, 3 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 104, 128 (1994) 
(noting that risk of conviction could alter crime rates but that more empirical research 
seeking that correlation is necessary).  Another wrinkle, in terms of specific deterrence and 
the subjective experience of punishment, involves “duration neglect.”  Paul H. Robinson, The 
Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1089, 1096 (2010–2011).  Some research “suggest[s] that it is both the maximum intensity 
and the endpoint intensity that determine the remembered punitive bite, but that the 
duration of punishment” has little effect, and that the perception of the punitive bite of 
incarceration degrades over time.  Id. 
207. See John J. Donohue, III & Justin Wolfers, Estimating the Impact of the Death 
Penalty on Murder, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 249 (2009). 
15 - WEISBERG (DO NOT DELETE) 7/18/2012  1:23 PM 
1248 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:1203 
perceivable by the relevant population—and they found little effect of 
this supposedly strong government message.208  Deterrence research also 
must stress that the real question is not about actual punishment but the 
perceived threat of punishment.  Thus, nuanced modern studies have 
tried to isolate the perception variable, figure out whether to test the 
variable among the general population or the criminal population, and 
then examine how changes in actual punishment explain the changes in 
perception. 
A rich new study by criminologist Gary Kleck and his colleagues 
came up with conclusions that will disappoint those who hope that 
changes in actual punishment affect perceptions thereof to make much 
difference.209  Kleck combines statistics on the actual severity, frequency, 
and swiftness of penalties from a wide sampling of counties with surveys 
of perceptions of residents of those counties.210  The analysis controls for 
many possible influences on perception of punishment independent of 
the actual facts, and the survey’s focus in particular is on self-identified 
former offenders.211  The result is a shockingly negligible relationship 
between differences in punishment fact and differences in perception 
thereof.212  The conclusion is that although the general deterrent effect 
may operate at some base rate to reduce crime, changes in penal policy 
or enforcement play little role in sending a message that crime does not 
pay.213  Indeed, although government might look to different, perhaps 
better targeted and better publicized ways of delivering the message, a 
lowering of penalties for many crimes is likely to leave any current 
deterrent effect undiminished.214 
If punishment had a significant marginal deterrent effect, the high 
visibility of harsh punishment in the form of mass incarceration should 
itself have been a powerful force in reducing crime.  But the empirical 
research summarized by Western—that the post-1990 spike in 
incarceration can only explain a small fraction of the simultaneous drop 
in the crime rate—suggests otherwise.215  Most likely, we have reached 
the point at which the baseline punishment in society is so high that 
                                                          
208. See David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, Crime, Punishment, and Myopia (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11491, 2005). 
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214. See id. at 654. 
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potential criminals are psychologically inured to additional deterrence.  
But as Western has shown, the potential deterrent message is even 
greater than what is captured by actual frequency or duration of 
imprisonment given the lifetime comic and employment penalty of 
incarceration as both an additional material penalty and a source of 
stigma.  Imagine the last twenty years of the imprisonment increase as 
an experiment to see if there is a megadose marginal increment so large 
that it shakes up perceptions in ways that Kleck did not find.  If so, the 
experiment failed. 
B.  Utilitarianism: Rehabilitation 
The last of the traditional theories of punishment is rehabilitation, 
and we have perhaps come too far to revive it as serious justification for 
our system.  We could have said that prisons successfully incapacitate if 
we had ignored prisoner-on-prisoner crime, but this fact makes 
rehabilitation no longer a realistic argument.  When an inmate appears 
less prone to crime upon release, the explanation statistically most likely 
is simple aging.  Modest improvements do come in prison through 
simultaneous drug rehabilitation, vocational counseling, and educational 
opportunities, and massive diversion of funds in this direction could be 
salutary both to incarcerated persons and to the ideal of rehabilitation. 
A broader conception of rehabilitation within our system of criminal 
justice implicates community-based diversion, early-release legislation, 
and evidence-based sentencing.  Because of the resemblance these 
efforts bear to the rehabilitative orientation of the American system of 
criminal justice before the 1970s, jurisprudes tend to conceive the 
movement in terms of rehabilitation.216  But properly understood, the 
use of alternative dispositions, as opposed to in-prison programs, is an 
avoidance maneuver that betrays our tacit acknowledgement that the 
effects of the system itself are not rehabilitative but criminogenic.217 
Distinct from both in-prison therapeutics and diversion from the 
jailhouse is the promising recent use of “shock therapy” through what 
has come to be called “smart punishment” or “motivational jail.”218  This 
renaissance of rehabilitative sentiment began in the mid-2000s with 
                                                          
216. See Cecelia Klingele, The Early Demise of Early Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 415 
(2012). 
217. Id. at 421. 
218. See James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the 
Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1557 (2003). 
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Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (Project HOPE).219  
Under the direction of Judge Steven Alm, the program aimed to reduce 
the burden that expensively harsh sentences foisted on the state’s 
criminal justice system partly by “scaring” minor offenders back in 
line.220  The movement proved successful enough that several states have 
implemented similar policies preferring a response to criminal behavior 
more like that of a concerned parent in correction than like that of a 
retributivist government in punishment.221  But this phenomenon is not 
precisely an exception to the functional obsolescence of rehabilitation in 
a system of mass incarceration— corrective effects come from short and 
controlled application of a medicine that still poisons in larger doses.  
Rehabilitation results, apparently, from a tangible, credible threat of 
further incarceration, and not from jail time itself. 
The overall picture is that today’s programs that do succeed in 
rehabilitation aim at avoidance of the system outright, mitigation of the 
effects of time spent behind bars, and reentry of people whose lives the 
system has damaged.  As Western notes, in the age of mass 
incarceration, “rehabilitation” seems to have taken on this new 
meaning—we no longer pretend that prison itself rehabilitates, 
recognizing instead that reintegration of former prisoners just requires 
rehabilitation from collateral damages.222 
The greatest promise for a true rehabilitation of rehabilitation may 
lie in the recent push to base our approaches to criminal justice anew 
upon empirical evidence, whereby judges use empirical data in an 
“actuarial manner,” tailoring the disposition based not on vague 
impressions but on concrete indicators.223  After all, alternative options 
clearly do vary in how well they reduce crime.224  This may be an odd-
sounding idea, but what gives us new reason to hope for broader 
acceptance of these “evidence-based” models is the recent realistic 
recognition on both sides of the political aisle of mass incarceration’s 
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long-term untenability.225  Somehow, we must address the problem—if 
evidence-based models work, all the better.  The prerequisite will be 
that our politicians abandon naïvely ideological intransigence regarding 
the system as it stands. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Tonry captures the ultimate difficulty of reconciling punishment 
theory with practice in Hegel’s cautious, flexible view: “[E]quality 
remains . . . the basic measure of the criminal’s essential deserts, but not 
of the specific external shape which the retribution should take.”226  
Tonry’s elegant essay ends with an acerbic look at a legal academy in 
which fashionable philosophies of punishment, especially liberal 
hybridizations of retributivism, seem to “provide coherent, articulable 
bases for assessing whether particular punishment policies, practices, or 
decisions are just[,]”227 despite a great deficit of moral clarity: “Policies 
have been adopted, and people punished under them, that cannot be 
justified under any of the normative frameworks developed in the past 
two centuries.”228 
Tonry refers us to the case of Ewing v. California, in which the 
Supreme Court upheld a three-strikes sentence of life incarceration for 
the theft of three golf clubs.229  Following its usual protocol to determine 
whether this punishment violated the Eighth Amendment as cruel and 
unusual, the Court considered whether any traditional rationales of 
punishment could support the sentence, deferring to the legislature 
when in doubt.230  Tonry asserts bluntly that this sentence would have 
outraged Kant, Bentham, and every serious philosopher in between.231  
But of course, courts never really assess punishment on moral terms, 
just on democratic terms—“contemporary conceptions of just 
punishment are at best muddled and morally incoherent and at worst 
non-existent. . . .  Justice by plebiscite, however, is not a normative 
conception of justice.”232 
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The United States has proved capable of reducing its incarceration 
rate, as it did slightly in the late 1960s and early 1970s before today’s 
major increase began.233  Even as he became the leader of a new 
conservative movement, Governor Ronald Reagan effected an amazing 
34% decrease in California’s prison population largely through 
expansion of probation and through more generous invocation of parole 
and fewer revocations.234  Paradoxically, today’s politicians have gotten 
somewhat ahead of academics toward reducing mass incarceration.  
Budget problems have forced legislatures to arrange hushed truces on 
demagoguery on crime, a lower rate of crime has pushed law-and-order 
politics off the agenda in national elections, and some states have 
reduced mandatory minimums for drug offenses—an infamous legacy of 
the 1970s.235 
Moves toward national sanity in criminal justice are modest and 
politically fragile.  The conventional view is that mass incarceration is 
here to stay for two primary reasons: First, as recent analyses have 
shown, once incarceration reaches a critical level, the criminogenic 
nature of the prison experience and the resilience of American 
institutions of criminal justice in reabsorbing and recycling recidivists 
(“net-widening”) reinforce the phenomenon;236 and second, although 
drastic retrenchments have actually happened, as under Reagan in 
California, incarceration numbers are now so great that proportional 
reductions have become politically infeasible.237  Jurisprudes of 
punishment will never play a major role in our penal policy, but they can 
do better than their current irrelevance by making theory face reality. 
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